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ABSTRACT 
 Deploying multiple autonomous systems that coordinate as a cohesive swarm on 
the battlefield is no longer science fiction. As new technologies disrupt the character of 
war, the American military is investing in algorithms to allow its drone forces to conduct 
swarm tactics across all domains. However, the current frameworks in development for 
conducting drone swarm tactics are reliant on centralized control. These frameworks limit 
the speed and flexibility of the swarm by placing an overreliance on perfect 
communication and by overtasking the centralized human controller. To overcome these 
limitations, the American Way of War should adapt; the military must explore novel 
strategic frameworks that can rapidly train drone algorithms to be effective at 
decentralized execution, thereby rebalancing the workload of the resulting 
human-autonomy teams. This thesis proposes that training decentralized swarming 
algorithms, using the synergy of wargames and machine learning techniques, provides a 
powerful framework for optimizing drone decision making. The research uses a genetic 
algorithm to iteratively play a base defense wargame to train local drone interaction rules 
for a decentralized swarm that generates a desired global behavior. The results show a 
reduction in average base damage of 78–82% (p<0.001) when comparing the mission 
effectiveness between a pre-trained and a post-trained defensive drone swarm against a 
baseline adversary. 
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Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology 
first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and swiftly adapts its 
way of fighting. 
—Defense Secretary James Mattis1 
A. STRATEGIC SITUATION 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy assesses that artificial intelligence (AI), 
machine learning, and autonomous systems will increasingly enable the nation “to gain 
competitive military advantages.”2 Military researchers also predict that advancements in 
these technologies will have a compounding effect across all combat domains as more 
machine autonomy on the battlefield continues to shift the underlying character of war.3 
Most notably, combatants have access to a higher quantity of expendable (yet, capable) 
autonomous hardware, combined with access to a higher quality of “smart” algorithms.4 
The confluence of these commercially-available technologies is progressing warfare into 
its next predicted evolution, where any force can now deploy a coordinated collection of 
autonomous systems (i.e., swarms), capable of mounting simultaneous, omnidirectional 
attacks, into combat.5  
                                                 
1 Colin Clark, “Mattis’ Defense Strategy Raises China to Top Threat; Allies Feature Prominently,” 
Breaking Defense, January 18, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/mattis-military-strategy-raises-
china-to-top-threat-allies-feature-prominently/. 
2 James Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018), 7, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-
Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
3 Lucia Retter et al., Moral Component of Cross-Domain Conflict, RR 1505-MOD (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1505.html. 
4 Jules Hurst, “Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 87 (2017): 105, 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1326017/robotic-swarms-in-offensive-maneuver/. 
5 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, DB 311-OSD (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html; Dave 
Majumdar, “Who Attacked a Russian Military Base with a ‘Swarm’ Strike?” National Interest, January 12, 
2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/who-attacked-russian-military-base-swarm-strike-24060. 
2 
Already anticipating these “autonomous horizons,” the Air Force has plans to 
integrate more swarming systems into their service by teaming them with the highly 
trained decision-making skills of their Airmen. However, beyond merely integrating 
more systems for human operators to control, each service must begin to adapt its way of 
fighting to delegate more decisions to the trusted algorithms of their autonomous swarms. 
To improve trust, and thereby retain a competitive advantage, the research of this thesis 
supports that America’s military should adapt a novel Way of Swarm that focuses on 
training not only its people, but training the decision-making algorithms of the swarming 
autonomous systems, to best optimize the combined human-autonomy teams.  
Senior military leaders foreshadow that the emergence of a general AI (i.e., a 
machine with an ability to think, learn, and reason like a human)6 risks upending the very 
nature of war.7 Analysts share this outlook, and agree that the immutable nature of war, 
often described as a contest of human wills, could eventually be transcended as a contest 
dominated by AI logic.8 In 2012, these extreme predictions compelled the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to focus on general AI investments as a primary effort in its Third Offset 
strategy that aimed at gaining competitive advantages against adversaries in critical 
technologies.9 More recently, the DoD’s strategic focus in AI expanded as renewed 
investments are helping solve a growing “big data” problem.10 In 2017, the DoD created 
                                                 
6 Peter Voss, “From Narrow to General AI,” Medium, October 3, 2017, 
https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/from-narrow-to-general-ai-e21b568155b9. 
7 James Mattis, “Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis En Route to Washington, DC,” Department of 
Defense Transcripts, February 17, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/1444921/press-gaggle-by-secretary-mattis-en-route-to-washington-dc/. 
8 “Getting to Grips with Military Robotics: Autonomous Robots and Swarms Will Change the Nature 
of Warfare,” Economist, January 25, 2018, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/01/25/getting-
to-grips-with-military-robotics; Elsa Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military 
Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence-military-revolution-
and-chinas-future-military-power. 
9 Paul McLeary, “The Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes 
Next,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/the-pentagons-third-
offset-may-be-dead-but-no-one-knows-what-comes-next/. 
10 Terry Costlow, “How Big Data is Paying off for DoD,” Defense Systems, October 24, 2014, 
https://defensesystems.com/articles/2014/10/24/feature-big-data-for-defense.aspx. 
3 
a cross-functional team, called Project Maven, that leveraged revolutionary AI programs 
to help human analysts work through overwhelming amounts of intelligence data.11 In 
2018, the DoD increased its funding for AI further, including $1.75 billion (over 7 years) 
for the formation of a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, $93.1 million for Project 
Maven (a 580% increase from the previous year), $15 million for service-specific AI 
investments, and over $10 million for the creation of an AI commission.12 Moreover, in 
2018, the DoD announced the removal of the “experimental” status of the Defense 
Innovation Unit (formerly DIUx) in order to expand and solidify partnerships with the 
private industries in Silicon Valley that are heavily invested in AI research and 
development.13 As a whole, civilian and military investment is pushing AI advancements 
aggressively in the direction of the singularity, defined as the moment when general AI 
systems will surpass all human intelligence,14 altering every facet of war (and peace).  
To the degree that this singularity becomes reality, a fundamental shift in warfare 
may prove to be true. Until then, a continued focus on achievements in narrow AI (i.e., 
machine learning techniques)15 offers a more immediate opportunity to operationalize the 
emerging technology to tackle complex military problems. One such military problem is 
the increasing threat of autonomous drone attacks (including swarms), which presents 
challenges in the air domain that some authors have characterized as the “democratization 
of airpower.”16 Events in Syria have shown how, for the first time since 1954, American 
                                                 
11 Cheryl Pellerin, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s End,” 
Department of Defense News, July 21, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1254719/project-
maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/. 
12 Jay Cassano, “Pentagon’s Artificial Intelligence Programs Get Huge Boost in Defense Budget,” 
Fast Company, August 15, 2018, https://www.fastcompany.com/90219751/pentagons-artificial-
intelligence-programs-get-huge-boost-in-defense-budget. 
13 Aaron Mehta, “Experiment Over: Pentagon’s Tech Hub Gets a Vote of Confidence,” Defense News, 
August 9, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/08/09/experiment-over-pentagons-tech-hub-
gets-a-vote-of-confidence/. 
14 T. C., “What is the Singularity?” Economist, May 14, 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2018/05/14/what-is-the-singularity. 
15 Voss, “From Narrow to General AI,” 2017. 
16 T.X. Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower: The Insurgent and the Drone,” War on the 
Rocks, October 18, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-democratization-of-airpower-the-
insurgent-and-the-drone/. 
4 
forces have faced threats from the air via adversary drones.17 Non-state actors, like the 
Islamic State and Hezbollah, are employing commercial drone technology to contest 
localized air superiority.18 Similarly, state actors, like China and Russia, are investing in 
swarm technology, leveraging the use of higher quantities of cheap systems to offset an 
American qualitative advantage.19 With both non-state and state actors advancing drone 
and swarm technology to gain a competitive advantage, the American Way of War20 risks 
losing its presumption of air dominance by not adapting to new technologies.  
Moreover, as America pivots its National Security Strategy to focus on countering 
near-peer adversaries, the fight against violent extremist organizations will still require 
attention and resources.21 Operating in this complex strategic environment will require 
innovative solutions that capitalize on the decreasing costs and increasing capabilities of 
employing trained swarms of autonomous systems. As articulated by Secretary Mattis, 
technology, alone, will never ensure success in war.22 Instead, the services need a 
strategic solution to integrate and operationalize new technologies. The emergence of AI, 
machine learning, and autonomous systems is calling for a change in the American way 
of fighting, but overcoming the operational challenges to meet the growing demand for 
swarming autonomous systems requires an updated framework to better train and equip 
the emerging human-autonomy teams. 
                                                 
17 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS Drones are Attacking U.S. Troops and Disrupting Airstrikes in 
Raqqa,” Washington Post, June 14, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/06/14/isis-drones-are-attacking-u-s-troops-
and-disrupting-airstrikes-in-raqqa-officials-say. 
18 Don Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones, and Supportive Technology,” 
Combating Terrorism Center, October 20, 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/remotely-piloted-innovation-
terrorism-drones-and-supportive-technology/. 
19 Kania, “Battlefield Singularity,” 2017. 
20 Brian McAllister Linn, “The American Way of War Debate: An Overview,” Historically Speaking 
11, no. 5 (2010): 22–23, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/405440/summary. 
21 Aaron Mehta, “National Defense Strategy Released with Clear Priority: Stay Ahead of Russia and 
China,” Defense News, January 19, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-
news/2018/01/19/national-defense-strategy-released-with-clear-priority-stay-ahead-of-russia-and-china/. 
22 Clark, “Mattis’ Defense Strategy,” 2018. 
5 
B. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
The principle challenge to adapting a military force to integrate swarm warfare is 
solving the span-of-control problem for an increasing quantity of autonomous systems, 
and thereby rebalancing the workload of the human-autonomy teams.23 As a recent effort 
by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab shows, responsively controlling individual 
decisions of large numbers of drones is beyond the cognitive capabilities of a single 
human.24 The speed, complexity, and scope required to effectively employ a large force 
of drones will make the current frameworks, which rely heavily on the human operator, 
obsolete. Therefore, in order to effectively employ drones as a swarm, the human must 
delegate more freedom of action to the collective decision-making algorithms of the 
autonomous systems. Delegating more decisions to the autonomous systems enables the 
human to focus on issues related to mission objectives, risks, and ethical concerns, 
instead of micromanaging drones’ actions in a dynamic battlespace. Although there are 
efforts focused on making the hardware, software, and interfaces for drones better at a 
tactical level, there is a gap in the research for how the military can operationalize 
decentralized mission-specific behaviors for swarms. This gap results in a human-
autonomy team that levies significant work on the human to make most of the collective 
swarming decisions and to centrally control the systems with real-time interfaces. 
An additional barrier to operationalizing this emerging technology is the ethical 
debate that centers on the application of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). The use 
of AWS has received various objections, which include views that their employment 
generates a responsibility gap, that AWS should not be used to make moral decisions 
because moral agency is not codifiable, or that even if they were determined to be moral 
                                                 
23 George Galdorisi, “Keeping Humans in the Loop,” Proceedings 141, no. 14 (2015), 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-02/keeping-humans-loop; Talya Porat, Tal Oron-Gilad, 
Michal Rottem-Hovev, and Jacob Silbiger, “Supervising and Controlling Unmanned Systems: A Multi-
phase Study with Subject Matter Experts,” Frontiers in Psychology 7 (2016): 568, 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00568/full. 
24 Gina Harkins, “Marines Test New Drone Swarms a Single Operator Can Control,” Military.com, 
July 23, 2018, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2018/07/23/marines-test-new-drone-swarms-single-
operator-can-control.html. 
6 
agents, they would be making moral decisions based on amoral motivations.25 In 2017, 
leaders within the AI community called on the United Nations to ban the development of 
AWS. Additionally, in 2018, three thousand Google employees demanded an end to the 
company’s partnership with the DoD, stating “We believe that Google should not be in 
the business of war.”26 However, as technology changes society, society generates 
defense policy that influences technology; this relationship forms a complex dynamic 
between war and society.27 For instance, in 2017, to establish acceptable limits on the 
development and use of AWS, the civilian-led office for the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy produced a document to guide the services as new commercial technology 
emerged.28 Therefore, although the debate is important and ongoing, it does not negate 
the necessity of utilizing the best technology to counteract threats from adversarial state 
and non-state actors. As such, this project focuses on objectively improving the strategic 
frameworks for enhancing swarms, and not focusing on their moral deliberation. 
To overcome these operational challenges within the broader strategic situation, 
this thesis focuses on the following research question: “How can wargames and machine 
learning be combined to train a decentralized swarm of autonomous systems, thereby 
enhancing the human-autonomy team?” By implementing a proof-of-concept of the 
proposed Way of Swarm, the research provides evidence that a machine learning 
program can repeatedly “self-play” a mission-specific wargame to optimize the decision-
making algorithms of an autonomous swarm to (1) achieve the desired overall mission 
objective and (2) reduce the workload of the human to overcome operational challenges.  
                                                 
25 Duncan Purves et al., “Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for the Right 
Reasons,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 4 (2015): 851–872, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276307723_Autonomous_Machines_Moral_Judgment_and_Acti
ng_for_the_Right_Reasons. 
26 Scott Shane and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work 
for the Pentagon,” New York Times, April 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-
letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html. 
27 Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the 
Pentagon (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2017). 
28 Department of Defense, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, DoD Directive 3000.09 (Washington, DC: 
DoD, 2017), 36, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. 
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C. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: TRAINING ALGORITHMS 
An examination of factors that have led to the successful employment of military 
air forces reveals that developing a superior training program (rapid, realistic, and robust) 
has been decisive in the past.29 However, as the character of war changes, training better 
service members is no longer sufficient. In order for autonomous systems to take on more 
of the decision-making workload, the development of a superior training program is 
necessary for autonomous algorithms as well. This approach will enhance the human-
autonomy team by allowing greater decentralized execution for autonomous systems. 
Advancements in AI research have demonstrated that reinforced machine learning 
techniques are capable of playing against themselves to train algorithms that ultimately 
outperform the best human minds. Machine learning programs, such as AlphaGo Zero, 
demonstrated an ability to create novel strategies to complex strategy games, such as Go, 
which rival the strategies perfected by humans studying the game for generations.30 In 
several hours of self-play, the program learned new strategies from an empty slate, 
unbiased by the constraints of human best practices. AlphaGo Zero now sets a standard 
for what it means to “train with the best in the world,” as machine learning techniques are 
challenging the understanding for what is possible for a machine to learn and master.  
Similarly, this thesis demonstrates that a swarm of autonomous systems could 
master swarming tactics by combining machine learning principles and reinforced self-
play of mission-specific wargames in a rapid, agile, and flexible training framework. 
Ultimately, the research of this thesis supports that the proposed framework could solve 
the span-of-control problem in order to better integrate machine learning and autonomous 
systems into America’s military and successfully adapt its way of fighting. 
                                                 
29 Ralph E. Chatham, “The 20th Century Revolution in Military Training,” in Development of 
Professional Expertise: Toward Measurement of Expert Performance and Design of Optimal Learning 
Environments, ed. Ericsson KA (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27–60. 
30 David Silver et al., “Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge,” Nature 550, no. 7676 
(2017): 354, https://deepmind.com/research/publications/mastering-game-go-without-human-knowledge/. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Advances in AI and autonomous systems stand to change the character of war; 
this necessitates a re-evaluation of the concepts relative to training the operational force. 
The proposed Way of Swarm demonstrates promise for developing a mastered array of 
mission-specific tactics for training the DoD’s impending swarms of autonomous systems 
and enhancing the resulting human-autonomy teams. The proposed framework leverages 
the capabilities of machine learning to self-play through millions of iterations of 
wargames with a rapid, agile, and flexible process that adjusts to changing real-world 
assumptions and field-tested observations. Ultimately, training high-quality algorithms 
for the DoD’s drone swarms and teaming them with their service members will help 
America maintain a competitive advantage... just as a focus on training the best quality 
service members has been strategically decisive for the military in the past.  
The following chapters show the results of thesis research and experimentation, 
supporting the claim that the proposed framework can effectively train decentralized 
decision-making algorithms for swarms of autonomous systems. Chapter II begins by 
exploring the paradigm of swarming warfare, valuable lessons from the study of warfare, 
and current DoD efforts for developing drone swarm tactics. It concludes by examining 
advancements in machine learning and its increasing potential for training algorithms. 
Chapter III outlines the development of a custom-built model, consisting of a swarming 
wargame and a modified machine learning algorithm, that serves as a proof-of-concept 
for testing the proposed framework. Chapter IV presents the experimental design and an 
analysis of the results that evaluates the effectiveness of the custom training model. The 
analysis shows that in only several days of simulation, the machine learning technique 
was able to self-play two million iterations of the wargame, improving the success of a 
base-defense swarm of drones by nearly 80% effectiveness. Finally, Chapter V concludes 
with major findings from this thesis, relevant applications for the DoD, and the benefits 
of further research that leverages higher fidelity wargames and more advanced machine 
learning techniques to operationalize the proposed algorithm training framework. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The encountering of swarms of autonomous systems31 and AI decision-making 
tools32 on the battlefield is no longer merely science fiction. Profitable commercial 
investments are now driving private and academic institutions to research and publish on 
both of these new technologies.33 As the National Defense Strategy emphasizes, “The 
drive to develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower 
barriers of entry, and moving at an accelerating speed.”34 Consequently, not only are 
these technologies continuing to disrupt the character of war, but also their associated 
active research is presenting an opportunity to reassess existing frameworks, and revise 
them, to maintain a competitive military advantage. By exploring relevant works about 
these technologies, and by assessing the current DoD-sponsored framework for training 
swarm tactics, this literature review reveals that the service-wide demand for autonomous 
systems is outpacing the ability to match inexpensive hardware with quality software for 
deploying effective autonomous swarms. Therefore, this thesis focuses on an overlooked 
area in the current literature, investigating how insights from the study of war and recent 
advancements in machine learning can help address this software gap. 
The following chapter is presented in five sections. First, the chapter explores the 
paradigm of swarming warfare, highlighting the demand and limitations of autonomous 
systems and their decision-making algorithms to execute decentralized swarm behaviors. 
Second, the chapter analyzes key lessons learned from the general study of warfare, 
including why training and mission command principles were critical factors in the past 
for integrating technology and adapting American forces to a new way of fighting. Third, 
                                                 
31 Raf Sanchez, “Russia uses Missiles and Cyber Warfare to fight off ‘Swarm of Drones’ Attacking 
Military Bases in Syria,” Telegraph, January 9, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/09/russia-
fought-swarm-drones-attacking-military-bases-syria/. 
32 Mike Lynch, “AI Cyberattacks Will be Almost Impossible for Humans to Stop,” Wired, December 
28, 2017, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ai-cyberattack-mike-lynch/. 
33 Daniel Hoadley, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CRS Report No. R45178 
(Washington Congressional Research Service, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf. 
34 Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2018, 3. 
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the chapter covers a DoD-sponsored framework for developing swarm tactics and offers 
an assessment on its strengths and weaknesses. Fourth, the chapter presents research in 
the field of machine learning, which is revolutionizing algorithm designs for complex 
strategy games, and demonstrates a potential for training swarming algorithms. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with how the insight gained improves the proposed Way of Swarm, 
while also discussing challenges and anticipated critiques to the framework.  
A. THE VALUE OF SWARM WARFARE 
Employing a formation of relatively simple, replaceable, and independent agents 
that function as members of a formidable force is not a new tactic observed in combat.35 
As with other military tactics, nature first evolved the concepts for employing swarming 
agents in warfare through millions of years of iterative predator and prey encounters.36 In 
natural conflicts, agents of ants, bees, birds, and fish enhanced their species’ ability to 
survive in hostile environments by evolving swarming tactics for defensive and offensive 
purposes.37 Mimicking the effectiveness of these biological species, military strategists 
incorporated similar swarm tactics throughout centuries of warfare. In classical conflicts, 
agents of horse archers and mounted cavalries executed a variation of swarming tactics, 
which scholars attribute to the success of leaders such as Genghis Khan and Napoleon.38 
In future conflicts, agents of autonomous systems will continue to improve the strength of 
these tactics evolved and executed in natural and classical swarms; moreover, they will 
have the resources to employ swarms at unprecedented scales and speeds.  
In the modern context, the term autonomous system refers to “a system that can 
independently compose and select among alternative courses of action to accomplish 
                                                 
35 Andrew Sanders, “Drone Swarms,” (monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2017), 6–9, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1039921. 
36 Joel Brown and Thomas Vincent, “Organization of Predator‐Prey Communities as an Evolutionary 
Game,” Evolution 46, no. 5 (1992): 1269–1283, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1558-
5646.1992.tb01123.x. 
37 Simon Garnier et al., “The Biological Principles of Swarm Intelligence,” Swarm Intelligence 1, no. 
1 (2007): 3–31, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11721-007-0004-y. 
38 Sanders, “Drone Swarms,” 2017, 6. 
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goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the local 
dynamic context.”39 When referring to a cohesive group of autonomous systems, the term 
swarming characterizes the “collective cooperative dynamics of a large number of 
decentralized distributed robots through the use of simple local rules.”40 Military scholars 
contend that swarming tactics composed of autonomous systems will be effective for 
combat due to a combination of resiliency and versatility.41 A swarming force is resilient 
if it has a sufficient quantity of expendable agents to sustain losses, meaning that any 
particular agent is replaceable and that no single agent is a critical vulnerability to the 
entire collective. Additionally, a swarming force is versatile if it can best decide when 
and where to rapidly transition (or “pulse”) from executing a dispersed maneuver to 
establishing a massed presence at a single position. Although a swarm can become more 
resilient with a greater quantity of autonomous systems, it does not inherently become 
more versatile, unless each agent can independently make smart local decisions that map 
to an overall mission objective without a centralized controller. 
High-performance and low-cost autonomous systems are becoming the ideal 
agents for swarming warfare. Commercially available autonomous systems, at the cost of 
a few hundred dollars each, are capable of automatic flight controls, high-definition 
imagery, speeds of 45 miles per hour, and altitudes up to 20,000 feet.42 Modified aerial 
drone designs can even reach flying speeds of 180 miles per hour.43 Compared to the cost 
of a single fighter aircraft ($100M), or military remotely piloted aircraft ($17M), a force 
                                                 
39 Andrew Ilachinski, “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy: Opportunities and Challenges,” Center 
for Naval Analyses, 2017, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2017-U-014796-Final.pdf. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kathleen Giles and Kristin Giammarco, “Mission-based Architecture for Swarm Composability 
(MASC),” Procedia Computer Science 114 (2017), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877050917317994. 
42 DJI, “Phantom 4 Specs,” 2017, http://www.dji.com/phantom-4/info#specs. 
43 Lisa Segarra, “This Racing Drone Just Set a Guinness World Speed Record,” Fortune, July 14, 
2017, http://fortune.com/2017/07/14/fastest-drone-guinness-world-record/. 
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could purchase and employ tens of thousands of small aerial drones on the battlefield.44 
With this expendability, losing dozens or hundreds of drones per day becomes an 
acceptable loss, thereby satisfying the desired swarming trait of resiliency.  
Despite improvements in expendable autonomous systems, the methods, and tools 
necessary for designing quality decision-making software for them to execute versatile 
swarming tactics continues to lag behind. Research highlights that while “methods exist 
to facilitate the unique design requirements of robotic swarms, no general method exists 
that maps individual rules to (desired) group behavior.”45 Thus, there is no current 
method for leveraging the military’s high quantities of low-cost systems with the quality 
of software needed to be successful. Furthermore, if each drone requires a proportional 
increase in the workload of human controllers, then there is a diminishing return for 
fielding the higher quantity swarm. In these cases, success will come down to the 
quality—not the quantity—of the swarming software. 
B. INSIGHT FROM THE PAST 
To anticipate what developing quality decision-making software might mean for 
autonomous swarms, this section examines what developing quality decision-making 
processes looked like for military forces of the past. Throughout history, the wartime 
performance of forces has, to a large degree, depended on the quality of their training; it 
was not the technology that won a battle, but how the overall force operated the hardware 
that determined the outcome.46 Historians contend that “the human in the loop is usually 
the limiting element in the combat effectiveness of the weapon… funding the weapon is 
not sufficient… we must also fund the warrior.”47 Historical analysis of aerial combat 
                                                 
44 Christopher Drew, “Lockheed Lowers Price on F-35 Fighters, After Prodding by Trump,” New 
York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/lockheed-lowers-price-on-f-
35-fighters-after-prodding-by-trump.html; Air Force Fact Sheets, “MQ-9 Reaper,” September 23, 2015, 
http://www.af.mil/About-Us/. 
45 Ilachinski, “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” 2017, xviii. 
46 Chatham, “The 20th Century Revolution in Military Training,” 2009. 
47 Ibid., 59. 
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provides numerous examples that support this axiom.48 The Vietnam War provides the 
most compelling of these examples, driving a revolution in military training across the 
services. Even though the Air Force led in every aspect of hardware, they suffered heavy 
losses at the hands of the North Vietnamese Air Force with only a two-to-one air-to-air 
kill ratio. Although some military historians argue that a number of conflating factors 
were to blame, others point to the significance of training by citing the success of the 
Navy’s rigorous and realistic Top Gun program, which contributed to a twelve-to-one air-
to-air kill ratio during the same timeframe.49 After the conclusion of Vietnam, both the 
Army and Air Force built on their experiences and institutionalized the concepts 
pioneered by the Navy with the development of large force combat exercises like Red 
Flag and brigade-sized training at the National Training Center.50  
Institutionalizing realistic exercises, focused on employing hardware at a tactical 
level, was one way the military leveraged the concept of wargaming to revolutionize its 
training; but the military also began to leverage computer-based wargames to train 
operational and strategic level decision making. In this context, wargames refer to 
“analytic games that simulate aspects of warfare at the tactical, operational, or strategic 
level… used to examine warfighting concepts, train and educate commanders and 
analysts, [and] explore scenarios.”51 Militaries throughout history have used wargames to 
gain insight and improve performance dating back to the 5th century B.C. with the 
Greeks playing Petteia, the 6th century A.D. with the Persians and Europeans playing 
                                                 
48Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, “The Lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict: 
October War,” in The Lessons of Modern War: Volume 1: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1973–1989, ed. 
Abraham R. Wagner (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Rebecca Grant, “Flying Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon,” Air Force Magazine, March 2002, 70–77, 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/March%202002/0302tiger.pdf; Jeffrey S. 
Johnson, “Initiative in Soviet Air Force Tactics and Decision Making,” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1986), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/21923; William W. Momyer, “The 
Counter Air Battle (Air Superiority),” in Airpower in Three Wars [WWII, Korea, Vietnam] (Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University Press, 2003). 
49 Brian D. Laslie, The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam (Lexington, 
Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). 
50 Jim Robbins, “America’s Red Army,” New York Times, April 17, 1988, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/magazine/americ-s-red-army.html. 
51 “Wargaming,” RAND, accessed September 20, 2018, https://www.rand.org/topics/wargaming.html. 
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Chess, or the 19th century with Prussians playing Kriegsspiel.52 More recently, the 
German and Japanese militaries used wargames in WWII before executing their 
operations in Poland and Pearl Harbor, respectively.53 Likewise, the United States used 
wargames in WWII to refine their operational strategy to counter German U-boats.54 
Today, not only are analytic wargames used to provide insight on countering threats like 
Russia,55 non-automated wargames are used to “study how people interact in military 
solutions…[and] study human decision-making.”56 Wargames provide a way to test and 
develop solutions in a low risk environment57 that utilize traditional planning methods.58  
Besides evaluating how forces trained, and integrating computer-based wargames, 
the military began to focus on ways to maximize the decision-making process of every 
serviceman. The Air Force started to train aircrews a decision-making model based on 
observing their environment, orienting possible solutions, deciding based on limited 
information, and acting to achieve a desired effect. Colonel John Boyd, a Korean War 
fighter pilot, coined this observe, orient, decide, act (OODA loop) decision-making 
                                                 
52 Roger Smith, “The Long History of Gaming in Military Training,” Simulation & Gaming no. 41 
(2010): 6–19, http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1046878109334330. 
53 Charles Homans, “War Games: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/31/war-games-a-short-history/.  
54 William Thomas, “Meta-Calculations and the Mathematics of War,” In Rational Action: The 
Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940–1960, ed. Jed Buchwald (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2015), 99–102. 
55 David Shlapak, “The Russian Challenge,” PE 250-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE250.html 
56 Matthew Schehl and Khaboshi Imbukwa, “Student Wargaming Activities Address Sponsors’ Direct 
Needs,” Naval Postgraduate School, July 11, 2018, https://my.nps.edu/-/student-wargaming-activities-
address-sponsors-direct-needs. 
57 Michael Peck, “Why the Pentagon Loves War Games Again,” National Interest, May 14, 2016, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-pentagon-loves-war-games-again-16197; Yuna Huh Wong, 
“How can Gaming Help Test your Theory?” RAND Blog, May 18, 2016, 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/05/how-can-gaming-help-test-your-theory.html. 
58 Department of the Army, Military Decision-Making Process, FM 101–5 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 1997), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/fm101-5_mdmp.pdf; 
Department of the Air Force, Risk Management (RM) Guidelines and Tools, AF Pamphlet 90–803 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2013), http://static.e-
publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_se/publication/afpam90-803/afpam90-803.pdf. 
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process in the 1970s.59 The Air Force leveraged this concept to “change the way it 
prepared the aircraft’s brain, its pilot, for combat.”60 Boyd taught his OODA loop model 
at the newly formed Air Force Weapons School under the premise that if a force can 
make decisions faster than an enemy force, they stand to gain a competitive advantage in 
combat.61 Additionally, the Air Force created the designed operational capability (DOC) 
statement, which leveraged Boyd’s concept of accelerating the decision-making cycle.62 
Realizing the cognitive limitations of the human pilot, DOC statements focused each Air 
Force squadron’s OODA loop on only one primary and one secondary mission, as 
opposed to general utility squadrons that were jacks of all trades, but masters of none. 
Lastly, the Air Force adopted a building-block training method that initially focused on 
basic skills and knowledge, gradually built to tactical proficiency, and finally culminated 
in a validation phase with live complex scenarios that included realistic opposing forces. 
Moreover, as the speed, complexity, and scope of military operations increased 
over the years, the services also managed to succeed in solving their span-of-control 
limitations by training and leveraging the concept of decentralized execution.63 
Historians have credited this concept as a key factor in Napoleon’s success, which 
reshaped warfare in his time, and continues to have relevance today.64 Specifically, 
decentralized execution emerged as one of the fundamental tenets of the “Air Force Way 
of War,” as it adapts to new generations of aircraft with exceptional speeds, range, and 
                                                 
59 Frans Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London, UK: 
Routledge, 2007). 
60 Laslie, Air Force Way of War, 2015. 
61 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York, NY: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2002). 
62 Laslie, Air Force Way of War, 2015. 
63 Clint Hinote, Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis? 
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Research Institute, 2009), 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo23521/a550460.pdf. 
64 Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of 
Modernity (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2009); Jim Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the 
Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command,” Defense Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 119–
129, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14702430308405081. 
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flexibility.65 All of the services now use the term mission command to embody the 
importance of maintaining decentralized execution in war.66 Mission command benefits 
forces by preserving tactical flexibility through a commander’s intent, allowing 
subordinate leaders to seize initiative by acting aggressively and thinking independently, 
to accomplish their assigned mission. 
Just as rigorous training, computer-based wargaming, faster decision making, and 
decentralized execution were critical factors in past contexts, it is reasonable to assume 
they will be critical in future contexts with swarms of autonomous systems. Researchers 
looking at future wars contend that the decisive factor in the quality of autonomous 
swarms will be the OODA-loop-like algorithms inside the hardware that will act either 
independently or in tandem with the human operators.67 In short, training humans will no 
longer be adequate for maintaining a competitive advantage. Instead, training algorithms 
will become increasingly critical to maximizing the effectiveness of the human-autonomy 
teams. Quality algorithms will enable more flexibility in the tactical environment and 
allow for decentralized execution at an unprecedented scale. Thus, as the character of war 
changes, a strategic framework that can rapidly train algorithms and can build trust and 
confidence between the human and the autonomous system holds vast potential.68 
C. FRAMEWORKS FOR TRAINING SWARM TACTICS 
The revolution in the American military training programs after the Vietnam War 
lack a fundamental component in today’s changing environment: strategies for not only 
developing operators to optimize the human decision-making process, but for training the 
autonomous systems to observe, orient, decide, and act on behalf of human-specified 
                                                 
65 Laslie, Air Force Way of War, 2015. 
66 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 3–0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 
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67 Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New 
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17 
objectives. Autonomy, implemented through refined algorithms, allows machines to 
process and multitask decision-making loops independently when assigned broad tasks 
by humans. Technology has advanced to the point where the human decision-making 
cycle could limit the overall potential of swarms of autonomous systems. Therefore, the 
DoD should continue to pursue ways to optimize the human-autonomy team that involve 
delegating more freedom of action to their swarming autonomous systems (Figure 1).69  
 
Figure 1.  Decision-Making Process for a Human-Autonomy Team70 
Efforts to enable cooperative dynamics or to engineer active swarming behaviors 
are still nascent in the military’s pursuits for autonomous systems in the air, land, and sea 
domains.71 For example, in 2015, the Office of Naval Research, under the Low-Cost 
UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) program, successfully controlled thirty aerial 
                                                 
69 Department of Defense, Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2012), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf. 
70 Adapted from Osinga, Strategic Theory of John Boyd, 2007, 2; U.S. Air Force Office of the Chief 
Scientist, Autonomous Horizons, 2015, 7. 
71 Daniel Gonzales and Sarah Harting, Designing Unmanned Systems with Greater Autonomy, RR 
626-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 
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drones autonomously over a predetermined path.72 In 2016, the program conducted its 
largest test by airdropping and controlling 103 Perdix micro-drones from an F-18 Super 
Hornet. The Perdix drones conducted low-altitude reconnaissance missions and operated 
in “small and large swarms to perform their missions.”73 Most recently, in 2018, the 
Navy added its first drone ship to the fleet, with future hopes of interconnecting multiple 
vessels as an autonomous swarm to scan the world’s oceans.74 Executing at even larger 
scales, commercial companies hold the world record for the highest number of drones 
controlled simultaneously. American and Chinese companies, such as Intel and Ehang, 
flew a thousand “light-show” quadcopter drones for marketing and entertainment value.75 
Although all of these military and commercial efforts are advancing the field of swarm 
research and application, they still face major challenges. First, they all require extensive 
man-hours to develop the swarm algorithms. Additionally, the developed algorithms are 
“static” in that they are only able to conform to pre-programmed patterns and formations. 
In other words, the swarming agents lack a robust set of individual rules that drive a 
dynamic and emergent group behavior. Lastly, they all require significant workload from 
the human operator during execution to achieve their specific objectives. 
Many working in the field of autonomous systems research have recognized the 
value of training swarms, but they have used different approaches and means to leverage 
its benefits. Some teams have taken a bottom-up approach, looking to develop complex 
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emergent swarm behaviors from basic subcomponents.76 These teams have used agent-
based models to study rule sets created for groups of autonomous agents and how they 
interact with a simulation environment. Others argue that the bottom-up approach can 
“often risk failing to meet higher-level system requirements if design begins before a 
higher-level system architecture is established.”77 Instead, these researchers put forth a 
top-down approach for developing a framework of phases, tactics, plays, and basic 
algorithms that nest under a specific military mission. 
One DoD sponsored effort for training swarms through a top-down approach is 
DARPA’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) program.78 OFFSET proposes to 
use a real-time game environment, and a virtual reality interface, to allow users to derive 
novel swarm tactics for autonomous systems through crowd-sourcing methods.79 By 
applying a top-down approach to swarm tactic designs,80 and by using mission-specific 
games to train, test, and employ swarming capabilities, the OFFSET framework is also 
helping to advance the field of swarm design. The program plans to pair its framework 
with baseline swarm characteristics produced by the Navy’s LOCUST program.81  
Despite the advantages of OFFSET, there are three limitations with this current 
DoD framework. First, relying on crowd-sourcing efforts may be problematic to maintain 
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over time; the size of the “crowd” may not be sustainable as interest (and funding) in the 
project ebbs and flows. Second, as different hardware and environments are ready for 
testing, a crowd-sourcing reliant method is cumbersome to rapidly repeat in training. The 
framework would require lengthy real-time replays of all the previously generated data to 
determine what behaviors are now obsolete or what algorithms may have become better 
tactical solutions with any changes to the hardware or environmental assumptions. Third, 
OFFSET over-emphasizes the need for real-time execution of swarms.82 The framework 
uses a controlling application where drone swarms move via “point-and-click” through 
the battlespace. Not only does this approach reduce the speed and initiative of swarms in 
operations, but the real-time aspect of the application limits the ability to speed up 
repetitions to train through thousands of potential tactical scenarios in seconds.  
Understanding that there is a demand for DoD swarming systems, the importance 
of training to generate quality decision-making processes, and that there is a gap in the 
current framework for training quality algorithms, the literature review now pivots to 
research in the field of narrow AI and machine learning to present a novel solution.  
D. REVOLUTIONS IN MACHINE LEARNING 
As with the theory behind swarming tactics, the theory behind machine learning is 
also not conceptually “new.” Modeling decision making as an “artificial neural network” 
first appeared in articles in the 1950s, supported by mathematical research inspired by the 
firing of neurons in the human brain.83 Progressing from early mathematical models, 
computer scientists developed fields of study around machine learning and continue to 
improve their techniques. The combination of greater access to large networked databases 
and exponential advances in computing power, particularly graphic processing units, 
allowed for theoretical machine learning techniques, like deep learning, to become a 
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reality.84 In 2015, computer scientist made substantial strides in machine learning by 
achieving human-level performance in an algorithm trained to play a wide variety of 
video games, demonstrating the technology’s potential to rapidly find game-specific 
solutions.85  
The concept of machine learning is a subset, though often cited synonymously, to 
the broader concept of AI. Machine learning describes a method to design a software 
algorithm where the person does not directly code the resulting decision-making logic.86 
Instead, the person specifies the parameter for inputs, outputs, and metrics for testing the 
results, and allows the machine to “learn” patterns through comparisons of training data. 
After sufficient iterations, the algorithm learns an optimal way to categorize or predict the 
best output given a new (untrained) input. What makes this technique powerful is that 
modern computers are able to iterate through millions of distinct algorithm configurations 
in short timespans.87 Given proper parameters, and data for training, the result of using 
machine learning will be an algorithm that can reliably accomplish a specific task.88 
Machine learning has three main techniques for training algorithms: supervised, 
unsupervised, and reinforcement learning.89 Supervised learning occurs when the 
solution has a known answer for a particular input. The software can work backward 
from known output-to-input to determine the proper weights and biases to assign to the 
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logic to get the desired results. Unsupervised learning is when there is no set result, but 
lots of data, and the programmer is relying on the software to suggest patterns in the 
datasets that may highlight hidden internal relationships. Reinforcement learning is 
teaching an agent how to solve a task in a simulated environment through trial-and-error 
and with rewards and punishments. While all machine learning techniques are useful in 
certain contexts, the emergence of reinforcement learning and its ability to train in an 
environment with little or no existing data, holds particular promise for training drone 
swarms how to operate.  
The novel approach that Google used in 2017 with its AlphaGo Zero project was 
applying the machine learning technique of reinforcement learning to a data sparse game 
environment to solve a problem of unprecedented complexity.90 In other words, the 
machine learning algorithm did not leverage an existing database of game solutions or 
previous information. Thus, with only the rules of the game, AlphaGo Zero experimented 
through self-play to accumulate generations worth of experience in the span of days and 
discover champion-level strategies. Similarly, applying machine learning techniques in 
data sparse environments related to mission-specific military wargames has the potential 
to change the character of war, specifically how future militaries will train to fight.  
E. A WAY OF SWARM: STRENGTHS AND CRITIQUES 
The combination of the existing DoD-sponsored frameworks that use wargames 
to simulate agent behaviors paired with machine learning techniques can produce a new 
framework that is rapid, flexible, and adaptive. This proposed Way of Swarm addresses 
the weakness of current drone training frameworks by incorporating the rising potential 
of machine learning and the lessons learned from the study of war. First, the combination 
of narrow AI with wargaming is rapid in execution and insulates the framework against 
the instability of crowd sourcing. The dependency on sustaining a crowd is replaced by 
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the persistent availability of AI and cloud computing.91 Second, both the narrow AI and 
wargame are flexible and adaptive to changing assumptions, such as new hardware or 
environmental conditions. For instance, if the rules of the game of Go for some reason 
changed tomorrow (like adding a wall in the middle of the board), Google’s framework 
could rapidly be run in days to again master the updated game. In a changing world of 
warfare, this rapid response to change is critical in design. Third, this framework applies 
top-down tactics development, but it does so by allowing the narrow AI to solve local 
drone interaction rules that optimize a global mission objective.92 Hence, the framework 
preserves the principles of mission command and decentralized execution. 
Despite strengths, there are also anticipated critiques for the proposed framework. 
First, producing and combining both high fidelity wargames and cutting-edge machine 
learning algorithms requires the combination of both the private sector’s knowledge in AI 
and military subject matter experts. Unfortunately, friction around these issues has 
already occurred with nearly four-thousand Google employees demanding an end to their 
company’s partnership with the defense department over Project Maven.93 The project 
aimed to leverage narrow AI to reduce the human workload required to process, exploit, 
and disseminate collected intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data. Therefore, 
to continue AI integration to enhance military projects, resolving these partnerships is a 
national imperative. 
A second expected criticism is the risk of the “black box” phenomenon94 of the 
swarm tactics produced by machine learning solutions. This phenomenon occurs when 
there is no rational explanation for the decision an algorithm makes due to the inherent 
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complexity of the machine learning technique used. The black box dilemma forces a 
balance between how much human bias to include in the swarm algorithm of the drones, 
and how much corresponding understanding is needed in the final algorithm. Ultimately, 
there is a balance in how much risk to assume. The trade-off is between low human bias 
and more decision-making flexibility, or high human bias that offers greater insight into 
why an algorithm made a particular decision, which can increase trust and confidence.  
Finally, some critics of computer-based wargames contend that the assumptions 
inherent in computer-based models will produce an unacceptable gap between theory and 
reality.95 According to their claim, this is due to the inability to capture human 
motivations like desire, commitment, passion, or will in simulation.96 Although these 
critiques hold merit, it also depends on the intended use of the wargame. Typically, the 
more specific the computer-based wargame (less generalizable), the more the model is 
representative. Proponents also counter that when researchers validate wargames with 
additional methods, such as live experimentation, their utility for prediction is stronger.97 
Therefore, tailoring the wargame to a specific mission, with a defined set of assumption, 
rather than a wide range of tasks limits the expected swarm behavior and offsets this 
weakness. Additionally, validating the swarm algorithms produced by this framework 
with tests in the field adds another way to mitigate gaps between theory and reality.  
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III. MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
SHALL WE PLAY A GAME?  
—Joshua, WarGames, 198398 
The model constructed for this thesis is a custom-built swarming wargame that is 
playable by a machine learning technique, known as a genetic algorithm, and is scalable 
for rapid training through a cloud-computing service. The wargame incorperates lessons 
learned from autonomous systems research, historic training of decentralized forces, and 
recent advancements in machine learning, and combines them into an architecture that 
focuses on producing emergent swarm behaviors. Although the custom wargame is not a 
high-fidelity or fully-featured implementation of the final Way of Swarm framework, the 
model does provide a proof-of-concept that operates at an appropriately high-level of 
abstraction to serve as a thesis research tool. The primary purpose of this tool is to 
generate quantitative data to explore the following question: “How can wargames and 
machine learning be combined to train a decentralized swarm of autonomous systems, 
thereby enhancing the human-autonomy team?” 
The following chapter is presented in four sections. First, the chapter discusses 
why the wargame was custom designed and why a genetic algorithm was selected for the 
model, as opposed to an existing high-fidelity gaming environment or a more advanced 
machine learning technique. Second, the chapter summarizes the design specifications for 
the wargame, to include the rules of the game, the layout of the gameboard, the assumed 
characteristics of the game agents, and the decision-making algorithm run by the agents. 
Third, the chapter outlines the genetic algorithm that accesses the wargame to help train 
key agent decision-making parameters for the game agents to generate swarm behaviors. 
Finally, the chapter examines the webserver that connects the wargame and the genetic 
algorithm, emphasizing how access to a scalable cloud-computing service incorperated in 
the model was essential to conduct millions of simulations for thesis research.  
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A. WHY BUILD A CUSTOM MODEL? 
The literature review indicated that elements of decentralized mission command, 
rapid iterations through self-play, and that scalability to generate results in a data sparse 
environment are important when constructing a useful swarming training model. Initial 
efforts to find an existing industry standard wargame that was suited for pairing with 
machine learning, and also included these design elements, was unsuccessful.99 The 
closest game identified to meet the research requirements was Swarm Commander,100 
produced by a coding team at Naval Postgraduate School—a leading research facility for 
swarming autonomous systems.101 Swarm Commander allows the game user to control a 
collection of simulated drones by building logical scripts and via point-and-click user 
commands. The user moves swarms around a map and assigns them a pre-planned script 
that they execute based on a playbook that the user builds prior to playing the game.  
Although the Swarm Commander game is a constructive tool to explore swarming 
concepts, it lacks three important elements for this thesis research. First, the design of the 
game focuses on a central controller (i.e., the user) to send commands to each drone 
swarm to facilitate game play. In theory, although the decision-making algorithm of a 
centralized machine controller could replace the human with a game modification, this 
would negate the ability to research benefits associated with training decentralized drone 
agents. Second, Swarm Commander runs in a real-time environment. The real-time 
display is ideal for allowing a human user to interact and update new commands to the 
swarms during gameplay, but this design reduces the capacity for a machine learning 
technique to rapidly simulate through thousands of games per minute to test different 
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tactics. Third, the game does not include the support for distributing and coordinated 
simulations across multiple computers (or multiple processors on the same computer) to 
scale the amount of data captured simultaneously. Therefore, without finding an existing 
wargame that met all the research requirements, the thesis team built a custom wargame. 
The thesis team also used a customized adaptation of an existing machine learning 
technique for the research model. Google’s AlphaGo Zero project used deep artificial 
neural networks and a deep reinforcement learning technique to defeat world champions 
in Go, a centrally controlled strategy game (i.e., a single player decides where to place all 
the pieces for each team).102 Theoretically, the team could apply Google’s deep learning 
techniques to a swarming wargame to develop decentralized tactics. However, the deep 
learning techniques still require additional research to determine how to modify the 
neural network parameters to train a decentralized group of agents that can coordinate for 
a collective objective. In other words, the goal for training a decentralized swarm is to 
train the agents themselves (i.e., each Go piece decides where to move or place itself to 
benefit the team), rather than to train a single, central player. Additionally, since artificial 
neural networks can generate a “black-box” solution to problems, neural network 
techniques can reduce trust and confidence in final solutions.103 For these reasons, 
although artificial networks and deep learning shows promise for tackling decentralized 
swarm training in the future,104 the model for this thesis uses an adapted machine 
learning technique known as genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms are similar to 
artificial neural networks in their evolution-inspired approach to solving optimization 
problems.105 Moreover, genetic algorithms are easier for researchers to explain in their 
execution and were more manageable to implement into the proof-of-concept wargame. 
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B. WARGAME: SWARMING AGENT-BASED MODEL 
The wargame created is a JavaScript agent-based model that simulates high-level 
decisions, actions, interactions, and resulting emergent behaviors for a swarm of friendly 
Blue Force (BLUFOR) aerial drones and a swarm of enemy Red Force (REDFOR) 
ground threats in a hypothetical base-defense scenario. The inputs to the wargame are six 
key parameters for BLUFOR agents and six key parameters for REDFOR agents that 
affect each agents’ local decision-making priorities. After the user, or machine learning 
algorithm, selects the agents’ key parameters, the game creates a stochastic scenario that 
is bound by the wargame assumptions; it then simulates five hours of a base defense 
mission in a fraction of a second. The output of the wargame is a score for much damage 
the base received and represents the effectiveness of the swarm searching algorithm. 
The wargame user interface allows a player to visualize the game environment, 
manually select the six key decision-making parameters per team, and step through the 
resulting simulations at a slower pace (Figure 2). The images on the top reflect the teams’ 
respective heatmaps, or their collectively communicated picture of the world, and the 
slider-bars on the bottom depict the key decision-making parameters selected per team. 
  
Figure 2.  Wargame Interface 
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The primary focus of the wargame is how BLUFOR drones can best communicate 
and position themselves on a gameboard to search and detect a hostile REDFOR. Since 
the focus of the research is on high-level swarm behaviors, the wargame does not model 
aspects of drone flight dynamics, terrain avoidance, or environmental hazards (e.g., wind, 
dust, darkness). Instead, the wargame models the decisions that a drone makes to 
determine its next localized move direction, or on which grid tile that agent should next 
position itself to best support the swarming mission. This move direction is a high-level 
command that enters the drone’s software for a lower-level autopilot software function 
(not modeled) to then determine how to physically maneuver the drone to the proper 
adjacent tile. Importantly, key local decision-making parameters for each team of agents 
are accessible through a machine learning technique that can then use consecutive games 
to learn what parameters optimally produce the most effective swarming behavior.  
1. Rules of the Game 
The wargame is turn-based, meaning all agents conduct their turns in order, based 
on each agent’s calculated action times. Action times depend on agents’ speeds and time  
delays for performing different actions. If two agents’ action times are the same for their 
next action, then the wargame allows simultaneous actions; this ensures impartiality, so 
that no agent always receives a first-mover or last-mover advantage during turns. A full 
turn is complete when all agents execute their simulated decisions and actions. Full turns 
take less than a second to execute in-game, but represent fifteen seconds in real time. 
The starting locations for all agents are controlled at the beginning of the game. 
All of the BLUFOR generate at the base at the start of the game. The REDFOR generate 
from randomly positioned REDFOR starting locations around the edge of the map, and 
they generate across a range of starting times (controlled by a key decision-making 
parameter). REDFOR knows where the BLUFOR base is located from the start of the 
game, but they do not get information about where BLUFOR drones will be searching. 
Additionally, BLUFOR does not have perfect knowledge of REDFOR starting locations 
or their attacking directions. For a BLUFOR agent to detect a REDFOR agent, it must 
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position itself to be flying above them (i.e., in the same tile) and pass a detection check. 
This check is stochastic and depends on several factors outlined further in Section 2. 
The top-down mission design chosen for the wargame is a base defense scenario. 
The mission objective for BLUFOR is to search and detect REDFOR, maintain a steady-
state posture around their base, and minimize the damage inflicted to the base (Figure 3). 
The drone swarm assists in providing reconnaissance around the base and helps identify 
potential threats for other (notional) friendly assets to appropriately remove from the 
gameboard. The mission objective for REDFOR is to get within shooting distance of the 
BLUFOR base (within 15 game tiles) and attack the base to inflict damage.  
 
Figure 3.  Base Defense Mission Overview106 
Each swarm earns a score at the completion of each game based on how much 
damage the base sustains. The base sustains damage when a REDFOR agent is within 
shooting range of the base, chooses to shoot the base (probabilistic), and successfully hits 
the base (probabilistic). Each successful hit does a fixed 1% damage to the base. The base 
                                                 





can never reduce its damage through repairs or regeneration. As such, the total base 
damage is a proxy variable to reflect how long it takes for BLUFOR agents to efficiently 
search and detect all the REDFOR agents on the gameboard that are an imminent threat. 
2. Gameboard 
The gameboard is a two-dimensional square grid that measures 7.6 by 7.6 miles. 
The board divides into 76 by 76 tiles (Figure 4). The satellite imagery in the background 
is a notional operating base, selected to provide the user a sense of scale. The gameboard 
does not contain terrain heights or objects (e.g., towers, buildings, trees) that might affect 
maneuverability of either force. Hence, the agents always have the option to move in any 
direction (including diagonals) or remain in their current tile. There are also no limits on 
how many BLUFOR and REDFOR can occupy the same tile location at the same time.  
  
Figure 4.  Example Gameboard 
Each gameboard tile has an assigned detection complexity score that correlates to 
the probability that a drone would be able to find, fix, and track a ground target in that tile 
(e.g., an urban or forested area is scored as a higher complexity score than open terrain). 
The benefits of including a complexity score is that it makes the gameboard asymmetric, 
due to underlying map features, enhances the realism of the scenario, and makes it more 
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challenging for BLUFOR to optimize on a single best solution for a search and detection 
tactics across the entire map. The detection complexity scores are rated as low, medium, 
or high, and are assigned manually based on a visual determination of the tile’s terrain 
composition. The combination of the tile’s detection complexity score, and whether or 
not the REDFOR is actively shooting at the BLUFOR base, generate a detection check 
scale for how likely a REDFOR will be detected by a BLUFOR flying above them. 
Additionally, each gameboard tile has an intelligence priority score that is known 
by each BLUFOR agent at the beginning of the wargame. The intelligence priority score 
corresponds to a known location where intelligence analysts predict a higher likelihood of 
detecting REDFOR (Figure 5). BLUFOR agents access the intelligence priorities score in 
their local search regions to directly influence their individual and collective search 
patterns. Since intelligence assessments are not always perfect, the intelligence priority 
score does not correlate precisely with where REDFOR attacks will originate. However, 
there is a slighltly higher probability of REDFOR starting their attacks from the higher 
intelligence priority score locations (i.e., “hotter” tiles). The scores system also allows the 
user to specificy no-fly zones (black tiles) for sensitive regions around the map, such as 
local runways, and to set the search limit boundaries for the BLUFOR agents. 
 
Figure 5.  Intelligence Priority Scores 
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3. Agent Characteristics 
Each REDFOR agent is a small enemy force that is demonstrating some form of 
hostile intent, or is conducting a hostile act, toward the BLUFOR base. They are best 
visualized as a mortar or sniper team. The REDFOR agents spawn from five locations 
around the edge of the map that correlate (weakly) to the intelligence priority score. 
REDFOR is able to detect BLUFOR agents one tile away (0.1 miles), which they can use 
to adjust the movement decisions for them and the rest of their team. All REDFOR agents 
have infinite ammunition. They have the choice to attack the base anytime they are in 
range, however shooting delays their time for taking their next action and it also increases 
their probability of detection. The chance of a REDFOR agent to successfully hit the base 
with an attack depends on their distance to the base. All successful hits on the base do 1% 
of damage. REDFOR cannot attack BLUFOR drones. 
Each BLUFOR agent is a single drone assigned to help defend the BLUFOR base. 
They are best visualized as a small and inexpensive quadcopter with an autopilot system, 
video camera, and communications hardware (Figure 6). All BLUFOR agents start at the 
base in the center of the gameboard and launch over time to establish a steady state 
launch and recover cycle. Each drone has a finite battery life and will automatically fly a 
profile back to the base to replace its battery when it reaches the limit of its battery. A 
drone battery replacement at the base takes six minutes before the drone can relaunch. 
 
Figure 6.  BLUFOR Agent Representation107 
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The majority of the baseline assumptions for the characteristics of aerial drones 
and the capabilities of hostile ground threats to a base are based on the assumptions used 
in previous research.108 The main agent characteristics are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Summary of Agent Characteristics 
Team Agent Characteristic Value 
BLUFOR 
Maximum Speed 30 miles-per-hour 
Camera Search Rate 3.5 square-feet-per-second 
Battery Life 2 hours 
Battery Replacement Time 6 minutes 
REDFOR 
Maximum Speed 6 to 12 miles-per-hour 
Maximum Attack Range 1.5 miles (e.g., mortars) 
 
The game also assumes that each drone flies with a proficient autopilot, avoids 
colliding with other drones, launches and lands by itself, communicates with all other 
drones, and uses onboard sensors to identify, fix, and track objects in the environment. 
Another key assumption, continued from previous research, is that BLUFOR are capable 
of distinguishing key features of REDFOR agents (e.g., weapons, military vehicles, etc.). 
Since the BLUFOR agents can rapidly make a determination of what activity appears 
hostile, there are no neutral agents represented in the wargame, as those (notional) neutral 
agents are already screened out. Although this is a significant assumption, the enhanced 
computer vision programs, like Project Maven, have shown this may soon be a reality.109 
Finally, data transmission between the agents is assumed to be short-range and redundant, 
and therefore inter-agent communication is never dropped, jammed, or incomplete.  
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Despite similarities in agent characteristics from previous research, the proposed 
model has two important differences in its wargame design. First, it does not rely on any 
centralized controlling authorities for executing commands. This enables the model to 
explore the benefits of a decentralized and self-organizing system of drones. Second, an 
emphasis in the scenario is that BLUFOR drones are strictly in search and detect roles. 
The drones pass any potential threats to (notional) friendly assets and the REDFOR agent 
is thereby removed from the board. The scenario does not intend, nor use, the drones to 
engage in any lethal strikes against the enemy. This is a deliberate design decision to 
illustrate that, without crossing ethical barriers, there are acceptable reasons for training 
autonomous systems, such as search missions, that can directly support the warfighter. 
All game agents communicate to their teams using a decentralized technique for 
passing information that is similar to pheromone communication methods used by 
ants.110 This pheromone method enables the agents to make local decisions about 
whether to add or remove pheromones, and about whether to follow or ignore 
pheromones, that results in a global swarm behavior as the teams disperse or converge 
around the gameboard. Each agent stores an internal pheromone map, visualized as a 
heatmap, of where the higher and lower tile regions of pheromones are located (Figure 7). 
The game represents each teams’ heatmap as an overlay, where a tile that has more 
pheromones (higher priority) is darker red, and a tile that has fewer pheromones (lower 
priority) is darker blue.  
110 J. L. Deneubourg et al., “The Self-organizing Exploratory Pattern of the Argentine Ant,” Journal 
of Insect Behavior 3, no. 2 (1990): 159–168, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01417909. 
Figure 7.  Agent Pheromone Communication Method (Heatmaps) 
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Agents update their heatmap each turn based on the communication reports they 
receive from other agents in their collective. Any agent can communicate that they have 
added or subtracted pheromones (i.e., heat) to tiles they visit due to decisions they make 
and the values they calculate based on the key decision-making parameters for each team. 
Importantly, all agents can only reference their individual construction of the collective 
heatmap; there is no single central reference map, and, in theory, individual heatmaps can 
diverge during mission execution. However, this model assumes heatmap divergence is 
negligible since each drone agent would use a secured, timestamped, and redundant 
communication method to ensure its messages transmit reliably across the entire swarm. 
4. Agent Decision-Making Algorithm
The decision-making algorithm for all game agents is based on Colonel Boyd’s 
observe, orient, decide, and act process (i.e., OODA loop). Each agent, in-turn, conducts 
an observe phase, orient phase, and decide phase of their loop based on the current state 
of their locally perceived environment. After deciding on what action to take, any agent 
that can take at least one action will simultaneously conduct the act phase of the loop.  
In the observe phase, each agent checks its internal status and its local external 
environment for changes. For BLUFOR, each agent first checks its battery state to help 
determine if it needs to return back to base. Then, all BLUFOR agents use their cameras 
and sensors to conduct a search of the single tile directly underneath where they are 
located. If there are REDFOR agents underneath, then each BLUFOR in that tile has a 
chance of detecting them. The probability of detection depends on the tile’s detection 
complexity score and whether the REDFOR agent is actively shooting at the base. For 
REDFOR, each agent first checks to see if they are within shooting range of the base. 
Then, all REDFOR agents scan all tiles adjacent to their current tile, trying to detect (i.e., 
see or hear) any BLUFOR drones. Finally, all agents from both teams reference and store 
the heat values of all their adjacent tiles (including the tile where they are located) to 
prepare them to orient the priority options for their next move directions. 
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In the orient phase, each agent builds an internal heatmap, or operational picture, 
on which adjacent tiles are higher priority for their next move direction. For BLUFOR 
agents, regions are hotter based on the gameboard’s intelligence priority scores, on a 
time-delay that incrementally adds heat to all gameboard tiles, and on drone 
communicated “starbursts” of heat (i.e., pheremone drops) that are centered around where 
REDFOR were discovered in previous turns. Regions are colder based on the chosen key 
decision-making parameter for heat removal rate that reduce the priorities of a tile for 
every agents that recently searched that tile. For REDFOR, regions with higher detection 
complexity scores and regions near the base are hotter on their heatmaps due to those 
being priority areas to shoot at the base. Areas get colder for REDFOR as they detect 
BLUFOR agents and alert others which tiles to avoid based on their observations. All 
combined, both teams observe the heat scores of all adjacent tiles, and then orient which 
tile among the nine options is the highest priority for their next move direction.  
In the decide phase, each agent determines whether to move to a higher priority 
adjacent tile (as determined by building their heatmap), remain at the same tile, or move 
to a randomly selected adjacent tile. The key decision-making parameter that controls an 
agent’s decide phase is the determined ratio of how often to explore versus exploit a 
given environmental scenario. To explore means to move in a random direction, whereas 
exploit refers to either staying at the current tile or moving to an adjacent tile based on 
which local tile has the observed highest priority (or heat) amount. Additionally, specific 
for BLUFOR agents, they will also decide whether or not to proceed directly back to base 
if they calculate their battery state is too low to continue searching. This decision to 
return to base to recharge will always override their decision to explore or exploit. 
In the act phase, each agent conducts an engage, move, and communicate action. 
For BLUFOR, the engage action is detecting REDFOR with their cameras and sending 
video information back to other (notional) friendly agents to remove REDFOR from the 
gameboard. For the REDFOR, the engage action is kinetically shooting weapons at the 
base. Agents only shoot if they are in range of the base and they decide whether or not to 
risk shooting at the base. Additionally, only 10% of the shots REDFOR decides to take 
result in damage to the base. Shooting also increases the wait time until the next action, 
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and increases probability of detection. For the move action, all agents will either wait in 
their current tile, or move to an adjacent tile, depending on the results of their decide 
phase. Finally, for the communicate action, all agents will send updates to their team that 
indicate which tiles they searched, what they detected, and whether or not to increase or 
decrease tile heat scores (and by how much) based on key decision-making parameters. 
5. Key Decision-Making Parameters 
The results of communicating and acting based on localized pieces of information 
among dozens or hundreds of drones executing hundreds of consecutive OODA loops 
forms the basis for a collective decentralized swarm. The decision-making process for the 
individual agents contains key parameters that affect how information is received, 
processed, acted upon, and further communicated to the rest of the swarm. Although a 
swarm could have hundreds of key parameters to manipulate, in demonstrating a proof-
of-concept, this wargame extracted six key decision-making parameters per team that 
dictates their local interactions and, ultimately, impacts their global behaviors (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.  Key Decision-Making Parameters 
For visual representation, the key six parameters chosen for both teams’ decision-
making algorithms plot in a six-sided graph referred to as a swarm’s personality polygon 
(Figure 9). The personality polygons have an axis for each key parameter that ranges 
from zero (center) to one (outside edge). Theoretically, any polygon that connects the six 
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axes is a potential solution for setting the six parameters that would generate different 
emergent swarming behaviors. Given that each parameter is adjustable up to a precision 
of three decimal places, this puts the number of possible personality polygons at 1x1018.  
  
Figure 9.  Example Parameter Polygons for BLUFOR and REDFOR 
Based on the complex interdependent feedback mechanisms between individual 
drones and their emergent swarm behaviors, it is not easy to calculate or predict the best 
values to assign all the key parameters. Also, it is not feasible for a person to guess-and-
check all combinations of possible polygons. Therefore, in order to train the swarms and 
find statistically better key parameters, the wargame was inentionally designed to allow a 
machine learning technique to systematically iterate through millions of wargames. 
The first three parameters for BLUFOR and REDFOR dictate identical decision-
making features. The explore rate parameters represent what percentage of the decisions 
an agent should make that exploits, or aligns with, the highest priorities of the collective 
(i.e., move in the direction of the hottest heatmap value), versus when to explore in a 
random direction. An agent that only exploits, would always position themselves where 
their collective heatmap was telling them was the highest priority location to move next. 
Yet, an agent that only explores, would always move randomly, and would negate all the 
efforts of the observing and orienting phases of their OODA loop. The heat regeneration 
per tick parameters represents how hot each tile should increase each turn to account for a 
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decrease in certainty that an agent sufficiently and recently searched a tile. Too high or 
too low of a regeneration rate tends to result in a heatmap that is either fully hot or fully 
cold after searching, and thus the swarm is unable to communicate any other relative 
higher or lower priority search regions. The heating/cooling rate per enemy parameters 
represents how much an agent will communicate to heat/cool a tile to its collective swarm 
when detected. All heatmap tiles range in a heat score from zero (coldest) to one (hottest) 
and an agent cannot communicate them to be hotter or colder than these values. 
Unique for BLUFOR, the heat radius parameter represents how large of a range 
(as a percentage of the assessed maximum REDFOR range) to communicate the heated 
starburst pattern. This parameter controls the distance the pheromone drop reaches, and 
influences the range that detection is likely to pull-in nearby drones to help investigate a 
region. If the radius is too large, the entire board tends to fill-up with excess pheromone. 
However, if the radius is too small, then the drones will not provide any pull to the rest of 
their swarm to direct them to leave their local exploring regions to support a globally 
hotter region with detected threats. The cooling rate on explore parameter represents how 
much heat an agent removes each turn as they search a tile. This factor reflects how 
confident an agent is that they successfully searched the tile, and how long until they 
believe another agent should return to search the tile. Finally, the explore limit parameter 
represents the furthest distance from the base that a swarm decides any agent should 
explore. The larger the limit, the more likely the swarm can detect REDFOR before they 
are within their maximum shooting range; however, a larger limit also means there is the 
more area for the swarm to search, thereby reducing the density of their search pattern. 
Unique for REDFOR, the percent spawn at main base parameter represents the 
ratio of agents that will spawn at a single staging area. The higher the percentage, the 
more likely REDFOR will attack the base from a single direction as a consolidated mass. 
The lower the percentage, the more likely REDFOR will attack from multiple directions 
with a more dispersed force. The attack frequency in range parameter represents how 
often an agent will try to attack the base if they are within their maximum shooting range. 
Although REDFOR may desire taking shots more often, as it is the only means to damage 
the base, the action of shooting also delays their subsequent action phase for the agent 
41 
and increases their likelihood of detection by BLUFOR agents. Finally, the max agent 
delay time parameter represents whether all agents should spawn and begin their attack 
maneuver toward the base at the same time, or whether they should spread out their 
attack over a few hours. Although attacking all at the same time increases the density of 
REDFOR for a single place and time, it can also be a weakness, since BLUFOR agents 
will tend to communicate for assistance when they detect a single REDFOR agent, thus 
drawing more drones to search in the dense regions of REDFOR. 
C. MACHINE LEARNING: GENETIC ALGORITHM 
The machine learning technique used to play the wargame is a modified version 
of a genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are a machine optimization technique that 
searches through an extensive range of possible solutions, referred to as genomes, using 
an evolutionary process that mimics natural selection.111 For the swarming wargame, the 
genome is composed of the six key parameters (i.e., the personality polygons) for how 
the BLUFOR and REDFOR agents will make their decisions and interact at local levels. 
A batch of many different genomes is called a population. The genetic algorithm iterates 
through an evolutionary process that uses selection, crossover, mutation, and randomness 
to systematically test old populations and create new populations of genomes (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10.  Genetic Algorithm Cycle112 
Completing one cycle of the evolutionary process is called a generation. Every 
several generations, the top selected genomes are tested against an established baseline to 
                                                 
111 Marks and Schnabl, “Genetic Algorithms and Neural Networks,” 1999. 
112 Modified from https://www.analyticsvidhya.com/blog/2017/07/introduction-to-genetic-algorithm/. 
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compare the progress of overall genome training. As the process continues over dozens, 
hundreds, or thousands of generations, although not guaranteed, the expected trend is that 
higher scoring genomes will continue to outperform the competition and succeed at being 
selected and re-populated as the most “fit” parameters for the training environment.  
1. Hyperparameters 
Machine learning techniques rely on user defined hyperparameters, or parameters 
that influence other parameters, in order to conduct iterations of training and testing on a 
given dataset.113 For genetic algorithms, the primary hyperparameters deal with choosing 
a proper fitness function, selection criteria, crossover logic, and mutation rates. Although 
optimizing these values is, in itself, an area of active study,114 this thesis research fixed 
hyperparameters based on effective values found in past research.115 
A fitness function is the basis for how a genome is scored, and thereby influences 
which genomes are selected for further repopulation in subsequent generations of the 
evolutionary process. With the objective of this thesis to explore global swarm behaviors 
toward succeeding in a specific mission, the fitness function chosen was proportional to 
the total base damage sustained at the end of the wargame. The larger the base damage, 
the lower the fitness score for BLUFOR and the higher the fitness score for REDFOR. 
Moreover, since the wargame includes probabilistic events during the course of the game, 
an average of all fitness scores across a sample of multiple games played results in the 
overall fitness score assigned to each genome. These overall (average) fitness scores are 
used to determine which personality polygons are statistically better performing. 
                                                 
113 Jesus Rodriguez, “Understanding Hyperparameters Optimization in Deep Learning Models: 
Concepts and Tools,” Medium, August 8, 2018, https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-
hyperparameters-optimization-in-deep-learning-models-concepts-and-tools-357002a3338a. 
114 Rémi Bardenet, Mátyás Brendel, Balázs Kégl, and Michele Sebag, “Collaborative Hyperparameter 
Tuning,” In International Conference on Machine Learning (2013): 199–207, 
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v28/bardenet13.pdf. 
115 Lee Jacobson, “Applying a Genetic Algorithm to the Traveling Salesman Problem,” Project Spot, 
August 20, 2012, http://www.theprojectspot.com/tutorial-post/applying-a-genetic-algorithm-to-the-
travelling-salesman-problem/5. 
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The hyperparameter chosen for selection is to pick the top 10% of the genomes by 
their overall fitness scores, mark them as elites, and to move those exact genomes into the 
next population batch without modification. This process of elitism helps to prevent 
taking steps backward in training, by ensuring there are some genomes at least as strong 
as previous generations continuing into the next population.116 Elitism is also effective at 
validating previous genome results, since elites will experience different environmental 
conditions (e.g., enemy spawn locations) in the next generation of game iterations. 
The hyperarameter chosen for crossover is to generate 20% of the next population 
from an “offspring” of sets of two randomly picked elite-genome “parents” from the 
previous generation. In the crossover process, one to five of the sequential values of the 
six key parameters are chosen from one parent genome, and the remaining values are 
chosen from a second parent genome to create a new genome. Crossover techniques are a 
method that systematically explores whether sequential pairs of values in a genome are 
synergistic and fitness enhancing.117 In this wargame, since several of the parameters are 
interrelated (e.g., heat rate on enemy, heat radius on detect, and cooling rate on explore), 
crossover helps to search for genomes with effective pairings of these sequential values. 
The hyperparameters chosen for mutation divide into two subgroups: gross and 
fine mutation. The gross mutation algorithm randomly picks elite genomes to generate 
20% of the next population batch. The fine mutuation algorithm randomly picks elite 
genomes to generate 10% of the next population batch. Both algorithms have a 20% 
chance of mutating, or modifying, any of the six key parameters of the picked genome. 
The gross mutuation changes the key parameter up to a maximum of 10% from its 
previous value, whereas a fine mutation changes the parameter up to a maximum of 1%. 
Including a gross and fine mutation process helps a genetic algorithm explore whether 
moderate or small changes in an already successful genomes can further optimize to find 
                                                 
116 Loris Serafino, Between Theory and Practice: Guidelines for an Optimization Scheme with 
Genetic Algorithms—Part I (Shenzhen, China: Kuang-Chi Institute of Advanced Technology, 2011): 16, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.4323.pdf.  
117 Ibid., 7. 
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a more precise solution, and to determine whether small disturbances in key values will 
have large emergent effects on the overall dynamic system (i.e., the butterfly effect).118 
Finally, the hyperpareter used for randomizing the remaining 40% of genomes for 
the next population batch is through a pseudo-random algorithm that picks new values 
from zero to one for all key parameters. Randomization fills the remaining population 
back to its original batch size, so that the evolutionary cycle can perpetualy continue. In 
addition, with a large percentage of the next population batch being randomly generated, 
this technique helps to search for unexpected key parameter combinations, rather than 
merely exploiting the current best performing genomes. Randomization is used to prevent 
getting stuck with a set of personality polygons that may locally be producing the highest 
fitness scores, but are not the highest fitness score relative to the global solution space. 
2. Initial Conditions 
Research using genetic algorithms has found that the initial conditions used by the 
machine learning technique can have impacts on its ability to produce useful solutions for 
optimization problems.119 Two important factors are the size of the starting population as 
compared to the size of the total solution space and the corresponding diversity in the 
distribution of the starting population. In other words, starting with too small of an initial 
population or too low of an initial distribution could result in a solution that gets stuck at 
a local versus a global optimal solution. Besides the quality of the fitness solutions found, 
the size and distribution of initial conditions also drives computational resources required 
to reach a solution. Evidence suggests that quasi-random numbers, or evenly-distributed 
numbers that still imitate randomness, provide a superior way to generate diversity within 
a population compared to pseudo-random numbers.120 Therefore, the model uses quasi-
                                                 
118 James Richter, “On Mutation and Crossover in the Theory of Evolutionary Algorithms” (PhD diss. 
Montana State University, 2010), 75, https://www.cs.montana.edu/techreports/0910/Richter.pdf. 
119 Pedro Diaz-Gomez and Dean Hougen, “Initial Population for Genetic Algorithms: A Metric 
Approach,” In GEM (2017): 43–49, http://www.cameron.edu/~pdiaz-go/GAsPopMetric.pdf. 
120 Heikki Maaranen, Kaisa Miettinen, and Marko Makela, “Quasi-Random Initial Population for 
Genetic Algorithms,” Computers & Mathematics with Applications 47, no. 12 (2004): 1885–1895, 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82606936.pdf. 
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random numbers as initial conditions to reduce computational resources and to reduce the 
potential to get stuck in a locally optimal solution. 
Applying the concept of quasi-random numbers, this thesis implements a Halton 
Generator121 to produce an initial population of genomes for BLUFOR and REDFOR. 
Figure 11 provides a histogram for the initial population of BLUFOR used in generating 
the experimental data. It highlights the generator’s effectiveness at distributing the initial 
values of the key parameters from zero to one across the six-dimensional search space.  
 
Figure 11.  Histogram for BLUFOR Initial Conditions of 100 Genomes 
D. SCALABILITY OF MODEL: CLOUD COMPUTING 
Creating a custom model of a swarming wargame, and giving a genetic algorithm 
access to manipulate that wargame, was necessary to generate quantitative data to explore 
the thesis research question; however, the model was insufficient without the capacity to 
scale the model’s architecture for rapid execution. Therefore, the research team designed 
the model to take advantage of a Naval Postgraduate School cloud-computing webservice 
located in the Coalition for Open-source Defense Analysis (CODA) Laboratory122 that 
                                                 
121 Heikki Maaranen, Kaisa Miettinen, and Antti Penttinen, “On Initial Populations of a Genetic 
Algorithm for Continuous Optimization Problems,” Journal of Global Optimization 37, no. 3 (2007): 405, 
http://www.cs.uoi.gr/~lagaris/GRAD_GLOPT/projects/genetic_POPULATIONS.pdf. 
122 Barbara Honegger, “NPS ‘Cloud Computing’ Lab Up and Running,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
February 8, 2010, https://web.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-Cloud-Computing-Lab-Up-and-Running-.html. 
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enabled centralized data collection and decentralized executions of millions of wargames. 
The result of gaining access to these powerful remote services was the ability to execute 
hundreds-of-thousands of complete wargame simulations in the span of a single day. 
Aside from generating data, all data across a full generation of wargames played 
must be readily accessible for a genetic algorithm to work. The genetic algorithm needs 
the fitness scores for all genomes in a tested population (potentially thousands of games) 
before it can iterate through just one evolution of its selection, mutation, crossover, and 
randomization process to generate the following population. Based on this necessity, the 
model relies on a web database to store previous population results and to also post new 
population generations that are ready for the next batch of simulation. With this 
architecture, any computer with a web browser is able to communicate to that database 
and determine whether there is an untested genome from the new population batch that it 
should simulate. Then, after all simulations for that genome (i.e., a sample of wargames) 
is complete, the computer communicates the simulation results back to the database and 
the process repeats. Thus, the more computers, the faster the output of the framework. 
Pairing the strength of a web-based database for dataset management, with an 
architecture that directly scales by adding more computing resources, the model rapidly 
expanded with the addition of cloud-computing access. The Naval Postgraduate School 
CODA Laboratory offered remote-access to a hosted cluster of 16 computer processors 
and 64 gigabytes of memory, which allowed 40 simultaneous instances of the wargame to 
be run for several straight days. Each instance completed an entire wargame (simulating 
five hours of mission execution) in approximately ten milliseconds. Access to cloud-
computing scaled the training architecture to execute millions of games over the course 
of a few days. This capability replaced the need to build a human crowd or to rely on 
personal computers to manually execute wargames. Ultimately, the custom architecture 
and model design enabled the generation of sufficient data for quantitative research. 
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IV. METHOD AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The experimental design for this thesis combines the proof-of-concept drone 
swarm wargame and the machine learning technique outlined in Chapter III to generate 
data for a quantitative analysis of the proposed Way of Swarm framework. To make this 
assessment, the machine learning technique self-played two million iterations of the 
wargame in a co-evolving format. This method permitted a statistical comparison of the 
performance of subsequent generations of the swarming algorithm against a reference 
baseline adversary. Ultimately, the experiment produced statistically significant results 
that address the thesis research question by demonstrating the ability to rapidly train a 
swarming algorithm that (1) accomplishes a specific mission objective and (2) reduces 
the workload of the human to operate a swarm. Additionally, the experiment highlights 
the rapid, agile, and flexible benefits of using machine learning techniques through co-
evolving self-play. The results show that the framework can generate an effective swarm 
algorithm, in only a few training days, while also being able to adapt to different initial 
conditions and environmental assumptions. 
The following chapter is presented in two sections. First, the chapter outlines the 
experimental design for testing the model. This section discusses the control and test 
variables, the requirement for generating a baseline, a test of the model’s sensitivity to 
initial conditions, and the co-evolutionary process for training swarms. Second, the 
chapter presents the experimental results and data analysis. This section includes the 
optimized key decision-making parameters for swarming agents for the wargame, an in-
depth interpretation of those parameters, and a statistical analysis of the model and the 
relative change in swarm algorithm effectiveness. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1. Control and Test Variables 
To assess which values for the key decision-making parameters produced the best 
results for each mission, the experimental design isolated individual agent parameters 
(i.e., six for BLUFOR and six for REDFOR agents) as independent variables in the 
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model. Additionally, the experiment either fixed or controlled for all other factors that 
impact the dependent variable (i.e., base damage) within a set range of assumptions. 
Table 2 outlines the controlled, independent, and dependent variables of the experiment.  
Table 2.   Control and Test Variables 
 
 
Leveraging existing military planning techniques, like the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP), the experimental design focused training on a specific mission 
set, environment, and scenario. The experiment also applied a concept used by military 
planners to frame the adversary’s capabilities, known as most dangerous course of action 
(MDCOA).123 This concept, which is similar to a prudential strategy in game theory, 
refers to finding a worst-case scenario by evaluating the adversary’s strategic options and 
their assessed capabilities.124 Using an intelligence assessment of the adversary, military 
planners develop the MDCOA from the strategic to tactical levels of war to develop 
friendly courses of action to maximize mission success. Likewise, this thesis applied this 
concept to help train BLUFOR by setting REDFOR to a (notional) assessed MDCOA. In 
                                                 
123 Department of the Army, Commander and Staff Organization, FM 6-0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2017): 9-15, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN7501_FM_6-0_Incl_C2_FINAL_WEB.pdf. 
124 Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy (Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of 
America, 1993): 70. 
Rules of the Game                                                                                   
(i.e., Mission, Probabilities, Base Damage)
Game Board                                                                                                      
(i.e., Board Dimensions, Human Intelligence Priorities, Terrain) 
Agent Characteristics                                                                                     
(i.e., Speed, Number, Sensor Range)
Genetic Algorithm Hyper-parameters                                                
(i.e., Elite, Cross-over, Mutation)
Independent 
Agent Decision-Making Algorithms                                                        
(i.e., Specific Parameters - Six Each)
Dependent Variable




this case, the REDFOR MDCOA consists of training against 150 agents with 5 attack 
locations and the capabilities for REDFOR agents as listed in Chapter III, Section B.  
Additionally, to prevent the machine learning technique from “overfitting” a 
BLUFOR solution based on human intelligence priorities or on fixed starting locations of 
the REDFOR, the experiment stochastically adjusts REDFOR starting locations within a 
fixed range for each game. For instance, the wargame requires that at least one of the five 
starting locations is within an area marked as a high-confidence threat location via the 
human intelligence assessment. The remaining four starting locations must start at least 
1.5 miles away from the BLUFOR base, but otherwise they have no further restrictions. 
This helps to reduce the overfitting of BLUFOR key decision-making parameters based 
on “memorizing” a known starting location. Therefore, although the gameboard location 
and terrain map remained fixed, the experimental design used a controlled variation 
within the environment to generate a more robust and generalizable algorithm solution. 
2. Generating a Baseline  
To assess the performance of subsequent generations of BLUFOR as the training 
iterations progressed, the experiment required a stable reference point for a comparison. 
Simply using the BLUFOR fitness score (i.e., average base damage) for each game would 
not be an accurate representation of the performance of the algorithm effectiveness since 
REDFOR is also improving for each generation. Google solved this challenge in its co-
evolving gaming framework by using the Elo rating system to assess the performance of 
its algorithm.125 Elo is a self-correcting scoring system, often used to measure the relative 
skill level of players in games like Chess or Go, based on past performance.126 However, 
since this technique weighted the points a winner received based on the Elo rating of the 
opponent (self-correcting), the best way for Google to increase the rating of its algorithm 
was to play opponents with higher Elo ratings. This thesis did not use the Elo rating 
                                                 
125 Silver et al., “Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge,” 2017. 
126 Paul Albers and Han Vries, “Elo-rating as a Tool in the Sequential Estimation of Dominance 
Strengths,” Animal Behavior 61 (2001): 489, http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1571. 
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system, as each genome would have required an associated Elo rating through all training 
cycles, increasing the data management requirements and complicating the design.  
Rather, applying the general concept of Elo ratings, the experimental design used 
a simplified progress-check against a known baseline. For example, instead of measuring 
a continuous swarm rating, the experiment used a trained group of elite REDFOR from 
the results of an initial run of the framework to serve as a baseline adversary. The elite 
REDFOR genomes represented a formidable set of opponents, embodying the concept of 
MDCOA due to its evolutionary stability, meaning these REDFOR personality polygons 
did not significantly change with additional training evolutions. This corresponds to their 
fitness scores not improving with further modifications to local interaction parameters. 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of personality polygons for the elite group of REDFOR 
genomes used as a baseline for future training. The shape of personality polygons after 
1,040,000 games does not significantly change, compared to those after 540,000 games, 
supporting the claim that they had evolved to a reasonable MDCOA level of proficiency. 
 
Figure 12.  Generating a MDCOA Baseline for REDFOR 
To expedite the development of a baseline adversary, the MDCOA creation matches 
limited the initial population for BLUFOR and REDFOR to 50 genomes, instead of 100, 
used in the final experiments. This allowed for generating the baseline in less time.  
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3. Sensitivity to Initial Conditions 
Research in optimization suggests that the solutions found by genetic algorithms, 
as well as other machine learning techniques, potentially have a strong dependence on the 
initial conditions (i.e. initial population of genomes).127 Therefore, to assess the severity 
of this effect on the model, this research performed a second iteration of the training 
framework, with a different set of initial conditions, to create a second MDCOA baseline 
for REDFOR. Figure 13 shows the personality polygons for REDFOR that resulted from 
using two different initial conditions. Although there are differences in the evolutionary 
process to reach the solutions, both iterations produced final polygons that display a high 
degree of similarity. This adds confidence that the solutions this custom wargame and 
machine learning technique produce are not highly sensitive to the initial conditions. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Sensitivity Analysis: Generating a MDCOA Baseline for 
REDFOR with Two Different Initial Conditions 
Therefore, the final MDCOA baseline for REDFOR (Figure 14) combined results from 
the initial and sensitivity test into a single set of opponents for training progress-checks. 
                                                 
127 Maaranen, Miettinen, and Makela, “Quasi-Random Initial Population,” 2004; Diaz-Gomez and 
Hougen, “Initial Population for Genetic Algorithms,” 2017. 
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Figure 14.  Personality Polygons of MDCOA Baseline for REDFOR  
4. Sequential Co-Evolution  
Applying the concept of self-play, adopted from Google’s AlphaGo Zero128, this 
research’s experimental design also enabled both BLUFOR and REDFOR to learn as the 
training evolutions progressed. However, to best control the training in a deliberate 
manner, each force co-evolved in an alternating sequence. To begin, both REDFOR and 
BLUFOR initial populations played and then simultaneously evolved new populations. 
After these matches, the next population of BLUFOR genomes played against the elite 
REDFOR genomes from the first generation. Next, the roles reverse, and the population 
of REDFOR genomes played the elite BLUFOR genomes from the second generation, 
and so forth. Table 3, depicts the chosen co-evolving sequence that alternates generations 
of populations against an opponent’s elite genomes.  
Table 3.   Co-Evolving Sequential Training Iterations 
  
                                                 
128 Silver et al., “Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge,” 2017. 
Genome Population Elite (top 10%) Genome Population Elite (top 10%) Genome Population Elite (top 10%)
BLUFOR 100 N/A 100 10 10 N/A
REDFOR 100 10 10 N/A 100 10




The experimental design used the genome population sizes as listed in Table 4. A 
primary tradeoff in selecting the population size was balancing the desire to generate 
statistically significant findings against the ability to run a large quantity of wargames in 
a short time. Since the best solutions for both BLUFOR and REDFOR genomes are 
unknown prior to running the first generation, the experimental design started with 100 
initial genomes for both forces. Subsequent generations applied the sequential co-
evolution process, limiting one force to only the elite (top 10) genomes to compete 
against a new population (100) of the adversary’s evolved genomes. Additionally, every 
match between each distinct BLUFOR and REDFOR genome conducted twenty games. 
This allowed for an average fitness across the twenty sample games, which accounted for 
the stochastic nature of the wargame and the variation in REDFOR starting locations. 




B. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA  
To assess the potential of the framework to turn a collection of decentralized 
drones into a swarm, the experimental design used 780,000 iterations of the wargame, 
conducted over two days, evolving both BLUFOR and REDFOR over 30 generations. 
Every five generations, the elite BLUFOR genomes played the baseline REDFOR 
genomes to obtain a progress-check on the performance of the swarming algorithm. The 
training framework concluded when there were no longer significant changes in the 
fitness scores of subsequent baseline progress checks. Figure 15 depicts the fitness scores 
(i.e., average base damage) plotted for each progress check across the 780,000 games. 
BLUFOR REDFOR
1 100 100 20 200,000 200,000
2 100 10 20 20,000 220,000
3 10 100 20 20,000 240,000
… 100/10 10/100 20 20,000 …











Figure 15.  Average BLUFOR Base Damage as Progress Checked 
Against MDCOA Baseline for REDFOR 
Figure 16 shows a visual progression of personality polygons for BLUFOR as the 
genetic algorithm processed through the solution space to find optimized parameters. The 
visualization starts with the initial population of pseudo-random genomes, then shows the 
first set of elite BLUFOR (top performers in the initial matchups), then the first set of 
their repopulated (or evolved) genomes, and so on. The expansion and contraction of the 
polygons is a product of the alternating co-evolutionary experimental design, and the 
hyperparameters selected for evolutionary elitism, crossover, and mutation in the genetic 
algorithm. Although this process can be computationally expensive, it also highlights the 
strength of a genetic algorithm to search a space methodically to find an optimal solution. 
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Figure 16.  Genetic Algorithm Visualized through BLUFOR Evolution 
1. Experiment Results 
The result of the training framework was the output of optimized values for the 
best set of the six key decision-making parameters for both BLUFOR and REDFOR. 
These six decision-making parameters drove the local interaction rules of each individual 
agent, which translated into the accomplishment of a desired global behavior (e.g., for 
BLUFOR, minimizing average base damage). This section presents the results of the 
experiment by highlighting the evolutionary progression of the personality polygons that 
culminated in a final set of best-trained parameters for the mission.  
Initially, BLUFOR and REDFOR started the experiment with 100 unique quasi-




Figure 17.  Initial Populations of 100 Quasi-random Genomes 
From this initial set of distributed samples in the search space, the experimental 
design enabled each genome of BLUFOR to play 20 iterations against each genome of 
REDFOR, totaling 200,000 wargames. The fitness scores (i.e., average base damage) for 
each match of 20 games determined the elite (top 10) genomes for each force. Figure 18 
depicts this initial generation of elite genomes per force. The variation of each set of elite 
genomes within the initial generation highlights how the genetic algorithm robustly 
worked through the solution space. From the initial elite populations, the experiment 
continued, performing the sequential co-evolution method for the remainder of the trial.  
 
Figure 18.  Elite Personality Polygons after 200,000 Games 
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Ultimately, after 780,000 wargames, or 30 generations of co-evolutionary training, 
the framework produced the best-trained genomes for both forces. Figure 19 displays the 
resultant elite personality polygons for both BLUFOR and REDFOR. 
 
Figure 19.  Elite Personality Polygons after 780,000 Games 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the specific values for the key decision-making parameters 
for the best-trained BLUFOR and REDFOR genomes. These values are responsible for 
the local interaction decisions of each set of individual team agents, which translated into 
the best accomplishment of the desired base-defense mission by the swarm in the 
wargame.  
Table 5.   BLUFOR Key Decision-Making Parameters after 780,000 Games 
Parameter Value Description 
B K1 0.208 Explore versus Exploit Ratio 
B K2 0.252 Heat Regeneration per Time 
B K3 0.924 Heat Amount on Detection 
B K4 0.231 Heat Radius on Detection 
B K5 0.159 Cool Amount on Explored 
B K6 0.105 Exploring Maximum Boundary 
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Table 6.   REDFOR Key Decision-Making Parameters after 780,000 Games 
Parameter Value Description  
R K1 0.287 Explore versus Exploit Ratio 
R K2 0.836 Heat Regeneration per Time 
R K3 0.985 Cool Amount on Detection 
R K4 0.299 Percentage Spawn at Main Base 
R K5 1.000 Attack Frequency when in Range 
R K6 0.006 Maximum Spawn Delay Time 
 
2. Interpreting the Data 
The proof-of-concept for this research used a high level of human bias in the 
development of the wargame, which also affords a high degree of insight into the results. 
In other words, since the game used key decision-making parameters that human 
programmers conceived, the resultant personality polygons are straightforward to 
interpret and justify. This increases trust in the resulting algorithm by providing the 
ability to explain how a trained swarm will likely behave in the operations, which is a 
valuable attribute when seeking to form an effective human-autonomy team. This also 
increases trust when human operators deploy a trained swarm by helping them 
understand the left and right limits, or constraints, of a trained decentralized swarm. Since 
the swarming algorithm trained for a specific mission, adversary, and environment, it is 
beneficial to examine the trained parameter values to help understand future behavior 
from within this narrow context. This section examines the values of the three parameters 
that are common to both BLUFOR and REDFOR, then analyzes the three unique to 
BLUFOR, and concludes by assessing the three parameters distinct to REDFOR. 
First, this analysis examines the best-trained values within the shared parameters 
of BLUFOR and REDFOR genomes (i.e., first three parameters listed in Tables 5 and 6). 
The genetic algorithm nearly maximized the parameter for the heating or cooling amount 
on detection (depending on REDFOR or BLUFOR) for both forces (0.924 for BLUFOR 
and 0.985 for REDFOR). This maximization makes sense for both forces. For instance, 
for BLUFOR, finding REDFOR is the primary way to minimize average base damage, so 
the term must have a significant weight to drive the collective swarm behavior. This 
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means that when a BLUFOR agent finds a REDFOR agent, it produces a strong signal to 
alert the other members in the swarm. Similarly, avoiding detection by BLUFOR is the 
primary way for REDFOR to maximize the number of agents available to attack the base. 
Therefore, when REDFOR agents detect BLUFOR agents, they produce a strong signal 
to warn the other members in the swarm. This concept is similar to the way ant foraging 
dynamics work through the use of pheromones.129 The stronger the pheromone, the 
stronger the collective behavior will be, producing a cascading effect.  
Next, the-explore-versus-exploit terms for both BLUFOR and REDFOR are very 
similar (0.208 for BLUFOR and 0.287 for REDFOR). This balance is in line with other 
research efforts in evaluative feedback, which emphasizes the need to allow an agent to 
explore, rather than just exploit, what it initially perceives as the best option to enable the 
discovery of a better solution.130 The trained values for BLUFOR and REDOR support 
this finding, but they also highlight that the individual members of a swarm are not 
particularly efficient in and of themselves. However, although the high rate of exploration 
can, at times, produce overlap, the power of a swarm does not reside in creating highly 
efficient agents at the individual level, but effective behavior on the global scale. 
Therefore, the vales for which the genetic algorithm solved through the framework make 
sense and are consistent with previous research in evaluative feedback. 
The last common parameter between BLUFOR and REDFOR is heat 
regeneration, which displays a significant difference in final values (0.252 for BLUFOR 
and 0.836 for REDFOR). However, both values make sense by examining them in the 
context of the wargame. First, the value selected for BLUFOR indicates that a lower rate 
for heat regeneration was beneficial. This makes sense since this parameter 
predominantly affected tiles with a preset intelligence priority (i.e., a location in the 
                                                 
129 Erol Sahin, Swarm Robotics: From Sources of Inspiration to Domains of Application, Report 
Numbers METU-CENG-TR-2005-01 (Ankara, Turkey: Middle East Technical University, 2005), 
http://www.kovan.ceng.metu.edu.tr/pub/pdf/METU-CENG-TR-2005-01.pdf. 
130 Howard M. Schwartz, “Multi-agent Machine Learning: A Reinforcement Approach” (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 52-56, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=1775207. 
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environment assessed as a likely location for REDFOR activity). However, the conditions 
of the game only required one out of five of the REDFOR starting locations to generate 
within these areas. Thus, it follows that the final BLUFOR genome would place a low 
value on this parameter, opting to search and react to REDFOR actions, rather than bias 
toward assessed threat locations. Conversely, REDFOR placed a high value on heat 
regeneration. This weighting is logical because BLUFOR drones travel at a much faster 
relative speed. This requires a dynamic operating picture to enable REDFOR to take 
advantage of fleeting opportunities in the relative positions of BLUFOR. For instance, if 
the heat regeneration had been lower, REDFOR would have perceived favorable moves 
as unfavorable (e.g., BLUFOR is no longer on the cooled tile). In other words, since the 
movement speed of BLUFOR drones was fast, the heat regeneration needed to be fast to 
accurately represent the environment.  
Second, this analysis examines the specific values for the parameters unique to 
both the best-trained BLUFOR and REDFOR genomes. Starting with BLUFOR, there 
were three unique parameters. First, the value for the heat radius on detection (0.231) 
controlled how far an agent would transmit heat from a location where it located a 
REDFOR agent. If the value of this parameter became too large, the heat map quickly 
became saturated with heat (Figure 20). The saturation effect inhibits effective swarm 
behavior by making it difficult to discern the location of REDFOR. Therefore, the final 
trained value balanced the need to increase the spread of information against the need to 
prevent an over-saturation of heat.  
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Increasing the heat radius oversaturates the heat map of 
individual drones by making nearly all the tiles appear as a 
high priority (red). This effectively increases random behavior 
vice effective swarm behavior. 
Figure 20.  Oversaturation of Heat Pheromone 
Next, the low value for the cooling rate on explored parameter (0.159) indicates 
that it was beneficial to place low confidence in an individual agent’s ability to search a 
tile (low cooling value). Consequently, this reduced how long it took for another agent to 
return to re-search the same location. Decreasing the revisit time between searches makes 
sense considering that the probability of detecting REDFOR agents is not perfect and that 
REDOR agents are constantly moving. Finally, the trained value for the explore limit 
(0.105) was the lowest value in the BLUFOR genome. This value indicated that it was 
beneficial for the BLUFOR agents to explore out to the maximum expected threat range 
of REDFOR, but not much farther. This is not surprising, because the sensor range for 
each BLUFOR was limited to one tile per time-step, thus the only way to maintain a 
sufficient search density of sensors was to heavily restrict the operating area for 
BLUFOR. It is logical to infer that increasing the number of BLUFOR drones or their 
sensors’ range, for this given scenario, could increase the value of this parameter.  
In contrast, REDFOR had three distinct parameters. First, the value for the 
percent spawn at main base (0.299) indicated that it was beneficial for REDFOR to mass, 
to a degree, but distributing its force across all five locations to produce a simultaneous 
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and omnidirectional attack provided the greatest chance for success. This is not 
surprising, since defending against this type of attack, referred to as a saturation attack, 
often proves difficult for military planners.131 Next, examining the attack frequency in 
range (1.000), a high value for this parameter was expected, as shooting is the only 
means to damage the BLUFOR base. However, a maximum value was not expected. The 
act of shooting slows REDFOR agents’ subsequent action phase and increases their 
likelihood of detection in the wargame, but this did not appear to inhibit the decision to 
shoot as much as possible when entering effective range. It is possible this is because 
REDFOR learned that the density of BLUFOR agents diminishes at greater distances 
from the base. Thus, the probability of detection increases the closer REDFOR agents get 
to the BLUFOR base (Figure 21), thereby making it more advantageous to strike as soon 
as possible.  
 
Black dots represent REDFOR agents detected and removed 
from the game. The figure is representative of most games, 
indicating the low likelihood of REDFOR getting close to the 
BLUFOR base before they begin shooting and getting 
detected. 
Figure 21.  REDFOR Probability of Removal 
                                                 
131 Fang Qiwan, Yin Zhixiang, and Jiang Chuanfu, Menace of Anti-Ship Missiles and Shipborne Laser 
Weapons, NAIC-ID(RS)T0337-96 (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: National Air Intelligence Center, 1996), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a313312.pdf. 
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Finally, the value for maximum agent delay time (0.006) indicated that launching 
the REDFOR attack as soon as possible generated the highest average base damage. By 
nearly minimizing this delay, REDFOR was able to start positioning its agents within 
firing range before BLUFOR was fully established. This makes sense considering that 
BLUFOR staggers the initial deployment of its drones. Figure 22 depicts this advantage 
by showing that when REDFOR begins its early attack, BLUFOR is still deploying its 
force, with only fifteen of its fifty agents on the board at the time. 
 
Figure 22.  Example BLUFOR Disposition for Early REDFOR Attack  
Ultimately, due to the degree of human bias in the development of the wargame, 
this research was able to analyze the resultant key decision-making parameters of the 
swarm logically. Explaining why the framework did what it did increases the level of 
trust that operators, within the human-autonomy team, will have when deploying a 
swarm. This insight frames the left and right limits of the swarm’s behavior while 
accomplishing a specific mission objective. Additionally, this highlights a strength of the 
framework, in that it reduces the “black-box” effect commonly associated with AI 
systems. By focusing on a specific mission and with understandable decision-making 
parameters, this framework enables a process for establishing a higher degree of trust in 
the final solution. 
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3. Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis of the underlying model and the resulting swarm algorithm 
effectiveness provides additional insight that can increase both trust and confidence in the 
solution that the training framework generated. This section examines three statistical 
tests that provide context into the validity and further utility of the experimental results. 
First, this section covers a regression analysis between the agent key decision-making 
parameters (factors) and the average base damage (dependent variable). Second, this 
section conducts a regression analysis to highlight residual risk inherent in the trained 
solution produced by the chosen assumptions. Third, this section presents a difference in 
means hypothesis test comparing the final algorithm effectiveness against the reference 
baseline algorithm. 
The personality polygons after training are both distinct and evolutionarily stable, 
supporting the claim that all key decision-making parameters for BLUFOR and REDFOR 
had a significant impact on the amount of average base damage that occurred. To verify 
this initial observation, and to further understand which key decision-making parameters 
had the most influence, this analysis performed a statistical regression between the 
independent factors and dependent variables. Table 7 summarizes the regression results. 
Table 7.   Statistical Significance of Key Decision-making Parameters 
 
B K1 Explore versus Exploit Ratio <0.001 ***
B K2 Heat Regeneration per Time <0.001 ***
B K3 Heat Amount on Detection <0.001 ***
B K4 Heat Radius on Detection 0.044 **
B K5 Cool Amount on Explored <0.001 ***
B K6 Exploring Maximum Boundary <0.001 ***
R K1 Explore versus Exploit Ratio <0.001 ***
R K2 Heat Regeneration per Time <0.001 ***
R K3 Cool Amount on Detection <0.001 ***
R K4 Percentage Spawn at Main Bas 0.935
R K5 Attack Frequency when in Ran <0.001 ***
R K6 Maximum Spawn Delay Time <0.001 ***
Model Significance (F-test): <0.001 ***
Note:
Key Decision Making Parameters p-value
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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The results of this statistical analysis largely supports the claim that the chosen 
model parameters were significant factors, with almost every factor across BLUFOR and 
REDFOR showing a high level of statistical significance (p<0.01) in how they affect the 
percentage of base damage. However, there are two exceptions. First, although the heat 
radius on detection for BLUFOR displayed statistical significance (p<0.05), it was not as 
significant as the other factors for BLUFOR. This could be because another factor, like 
heat amount on detection, could interact with this term and reduce its impact. Next, the 
percentage spawn at main base parameter did not display statistical significance (p>0.9). 
Even though the trained value converged at 0.299, statistical regression did not indicate 
that this value had strong influence on the average base damage. This could be because 
the wargame did not give REDFOR the choice of how many locations it could spawn 
from, but rather how many forces it consolidated into its main effort. Also, the wargame 
did not allow different spawn locations to stager their attacks, relative to one another. 
These facts likely diminished the impact this factor had on the average base damage.  
Even though the final BLUFOR personality polygon represents the best-trained 
swarm algorithm, the framework also offers the ability to identify residual risk inherent in 
the specific scenario. By examining the final matchups between the trained BLUFOR 
genomes and the MDCOA REDFOR genomes, analysts can determine common aspects 
within the sample data that lead to the worst outcomes. For instance, a particular portion 
of the environment may offer greater advantages to the attacking force, which then 
consistently leads to higher average base damage, regardless of the defending swarm’s 
algorithm. To determine if this was the case, the analysis included a statistical regression 
between the number of spawn points within one of the four main quadrants of the board 
(northeast, southeast, southwest, and northwest) and the overall base damage. Table 8 
depicts the results of this regression. The data for this regression came from a sample of 
twenty iterations of the wargame between the trained BLUFOR and the baseline 
REDFOR genomes. 
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Table 8.   Regression Analysis to Highlight Residual Risk 
 
The results of this analysis indicated that REDFOR has a statistically significant 
advantage by spawning more forces from the northwest portion of the board (p<0.01), 
with a nearly three-fold increase, on average, in the amount of base damage produced 
when compared to the next highest region. This is likely because the terrain complexity 
in this portion of the board gives REDFOR an advantage by making it more difficult for 
BLUFOR to find them. Highlighting this residual risk allows commanders to design a 
layered defense, focusing efforts to the northwest, that combines other countermeasures 
with a swarm. This increases confidence that the swarm will produce the intended results. 
Finally, this research performed a difference in means hypothesis test comparison 
between the performances of subsequent generations of the swarming algorithm against 
the reference baseline algorithm. First, the initial population of BLUFOR genomes 
created using the quasi-random process played the reference baseline REDFOR. The 
results of this run provided a starting point to compare subsequent generations of the 
BLUFOR algorithm, which resulted in an average base damage just over 120%. Next, the 
elite BLUFOR produced from the first generation played against the baseline REDFOR 
to produce the second point, resulting in an average base damage of 70%. The process 
accomplished baseline checks every five generations until the training cycle concluded. 
After thirty generations, a difference in means hypothesis test compared the resulting 
average base damage of 41% to the initial (pre-trained) baseline algorithm effectiveness. 
The test concluded at a 95% confidence level that, against the most-dangerous REDFOR, 
the difference between the average base damage from the initial generation (pre-training) 
and final generation (post-training) of BLUFOR is a reduction of 78-82% damage. 
Quadrant Coefficent
NE 0.07 0.013 **
SE 0.04 0.174
SW 0.04 0.223
NW 0.19 <0.001 ***






The experimental results from this thesis show that machine learning techniques 
are effective at training the decision-making algorithms for a decentralized swarm of 
drones using the rapid self-play of a mission-specific wargame. Although these results 
offer a promising indication of the value of the proposed Way of Swarm framework, the 
findings also raise two additional questions: (1) where can the military use the framework 
to enhance its forces (i.e., “so what”), and (2) what are additional research efforts that can 
improve the framework (i.e., “now what”)? The conclusion explores these questions by 
examining where this proof-of-concept model could scale up to meet the requirements of 
American military forces that would benefit by deploying decentralized swarms across all 
battlefield domains. Additionally, the conclusion discusses how further investments of 
resources and research into the framework components, such as improved model designs, 
sensitivity analysis, field tests, and user interfaces, can extend this research to serve as a 
stronger foundation for an operationalized framework for training America’s swarms. 
The following chapter is presented in four sections. First, the chapter reflects on 
three major findings from this thesis to reinforce the key lessons learned from swarming 
research and experimentation with the custom-built swarm model. Second, the chapter 
reviews why selecting decentralized drones was an important factor for this research and 
it presents a set of mission-specific vignettes to highlight cross-domain applications for 
training decentralized swarms. Third, the chapter offers a series of further research 
opportunities that can improve the proposed framework, increase the trust for 
operationalizing the resulting algorithms, and enhance the overall understanding of when 
decentralized (versus centralized) control of swarming autonomous systems is more 
effective for a variety of mission types and environments. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with an inclusive summary of the thesis that reemphasizes the relevance and urgency of 
swarming research and reiterates how the role of the human decision maker is shifting—
but is no less critical—in drone swarm ways of warfare. 
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A. MAJOR FINDINGS 
1. Algorithms should be a Training Priority 
Beyond merely focusing on training the human operator to be better at controlling 
their machines, the American Way of War must adapt to prioritize training the decision-
making algorithms of the machines. Traditionally, military leaders design robust training 
programs with the intent to improve the decision-making process of their personnel and 
to enhance their effectiveness at accomplishing a specific task or mission.132 However, 
with the emergence of AI and machine learning techniques, leaders must begin to adjust 
their long-held paradigms of what it means to train the operational forces; they must 
consider that the algorithms inside the machines can also improve their decision-making 
process by conducting similar robust training programs to those of personnel.  
By developing training programs for machines, there is no longer a requirement 
for the algorithms for an autonomous system to be hard-coded by a human programmer 
(i.e., prescribing exactly what parameters the machine should use to make its decisions). 
Instead, it is possible to develop a shell of an algorithm, without knowing optimal 
decision-making parameters, and to allow machine learning to develop a recommended 
set of parameters that is best fit to achieve a specified task. For this thesis, the proof-of-
concept model demonstrated that this type of machine learning framework is possible for 
training decentralized swarms, and with additional research, this process may prove to be 
faster and more successful at optimizing solutions compared to a human programmer.133 
Therefore, with a proper algorithm training framework, the idea of drones “self-learning” 
how to accomplish a mission as a collective could become just as routine as personnel 
who learn from their hands-on experiences (similar to reinforcement machine learning) or 
learn from a subject matter expert (similar to supervised machine learning). 
                                                 
132 J. Fletcher and P. Chatelier, An Overview of Military Training, IDA Document D-2514 (Alexandria, 
VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2000), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a408439.pdf. 
133 Silver et al., “Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge,” 2017; Vincent, “AI Bots 
Beat Humans,” 2018.  
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Optimizing the decentralized decision-making algorithms of autonomous systems 
is essential for overcoming the span-of-control limitations for centrally coordinating large 
quantities of drones. The ultimate objective of the human-autonomy team is to optimize 
the combined decision-making effort of the human and the machine. Furthermore, when 
the human decision maker becomes over-tasked or is out-performed in their mental or 
physical reaction times, then the team must prioritize building trust and confidence in the 
algorithms of the autonomous systems in order to enable delegating more of the cognitive 
workload. Once the machine is proficient at tasks, below the level of accepted risk where 
the operator trusts the actions of the algorithm, then the operator can assign more tasks to 
the machine. This rebalances the workload of the team, allowing the operator to focus on 
mission aspects that are unique to the person (e.g., ethics, empathy, risk). Ultimately, it is 
not the decision-making process (i.e., OODA loop) of either the human or machine, that 
must outperform the adversary’s decision-making process, but it is the combination of the 
overall human-autonomy team that military leaders must effectively train to succeed. 
2. Design Wargames for Machine Learning Integration 
The right type of wargame is necessary to serve as a training platform to generate 
a large quantity of datasets for machine learning techniques to train swarming algorithms. 
Currently, there are no prerecorded datasets that demonstrate how a drone swarm should 
optimally behave in different military mission sets or environments. Thus, a framework 
that uses simulated agents and environments to generate data is suited to the data-sparse 
field of swarm research. However, to generate millions of game results for reinforcement 
machine learning techniques to learn from those experiences, the wargame design needs 
to be capable of fully executing simulated missions in a short time span. There are very 
few existing wargames that are designed to rapidly execute millions of games and that are 
built to integrate machine learning with direct access into the parameters of wargame 
agents. To overcome this limitation, and to generate higher quantities of game results, 
designers should ensure that the wargames are capable of executing at a speed faster than 
real time, that wargames can be entirely self-played by AI players, and that wargames can 
distribute across multiple computers that collaborate in data collection and generation.  
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Furthermore, wargame designers for swarm algorithm design should consider the 
benefits of resisting the trend of designing software with immersive real-time interfaces 
(e.g., touchscreen or virtual reality) and resisting a priority on high-definition graphics.134 
While these types of simulations can be ideal for enhanced human training, the delays for 
constantly waiting for mandatory user inputs and the processing requirements to display 
real-time graphics reduces the pace for an AI system to rapidly iterate through millions of 
self-played games. Therefore, as designers consider how to incorporate the power of 
machine learning techniques to determine drone agent decision-making parameters, they 
should consider how their wargames can benefit swarm algorithm design through either 
faster game play (for the machine) or higher-fidelity game play (for the human). 
3. Machine Learning is Effective and Accessible 
One of the most significant findings from this thesis research was that machine 
learning techniques and the computing power necessary to effectively train the decision-
making algorithm for a swarm of autonomous systems are readily accessible resources. 
The genetic algorithm that was effective in this research at rapidly searching through a 
vast solution space for optimized parameters is reproducible in any coding language. 
Additionally, companies such as Google, Facebook, and IBM are packaging and freely 
distributing their more powerful machine learning techniques (e.g., deep artificial neural 
networks and Q-learning algorithms).135 Furthermore, with the decreasing costs of data 
storage, and the increasing speeds of networking, there exists low-cost solutions to create 
highly capable data centers and distributed cloud-computing environment that can extend 
beyond large companies or research institutions.136 This emerging combination of readily 
available access to data processing power, data storage, and data-driven machine learning 
                                                 
134 Philip Sabin, Simulating War: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games (London, UK: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2014), 35. 
135 Murray Newlands, “The Democratization of Machine Learning is at Hand and this AI Company is 
on the Front Lines,” Forbes, October 20, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnewlands/2017/10/20/the-
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136 Nabil Sultan, “Cloud Computing: A Democratizing Force?” International Journal of Information 
Management 33, no. 5 (October 2013), 
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techniques is revolutionizing the ability to transition from studying the theories of what is 
possible through AI advancements, and applying those theories to real challenges. 
 An important concept explored in this thesis research is that the computing power 
of large cloud-computing data centers does not need to be inside of the relatively small 
hardware of each drone agent to harness the benefits of machine learning techniques. 
Moreover, there does not need to be a stream of communication between the swarm and 
the cloud, since each drone does not need to wait on a centralized controller or algorithm 
to decide what action each agent should make. Instead, this framework demonstrated that 
operators can use cloud-computing services, narrow AI, and wargame simulations before 
the mission to train a predetermined algorithm set for each agent. The operator can then 
copy and upload the trained parameters (a smaller computer file that is computationally 
inexpensive to run) into the individual drones to execute. This process of pretraining the 
algorithm and then deploying it is similar to how cellular phones can learn to recognize 
faces or voices in their deployed applications.137 Although the algorithm of how to detect 
specific features was pretrained on powerful data center computers, once the algorithm 
was trained, it can deploy to less powerful computers for execution.  
B. OPERATIONALIZING THE FRAMEWORK  
The emergence of commercially available technologies, like AI and autonomous 
systems, is progressing warfare into its next evolution, where any force, including both 
non-state and state actors, can deploy a swarm into combat. Given this change in the 
character of war, figuring out how to not only leverage swarms, but also how to defend 
against them, is critical for a competitive strategy. Many within the DoD have recognized 
the rising cost of military hardware and the corresponding decrease in the quantity the 
services can field.138 The military has sought to reverse this trend by investing in large 
quantities of cheap systems (like drone swarms), yet it has overlooked a crucial element: 
                                                 
137 “Machine Learning and Mobile: Deploying Models on the Edge,” Algorithmia, June 21, 2018, 
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how to train this autonomous swarming component to perform the variety of different 
missions across the services. To leverage the full potential of swarms, the DoD must 
focus algorithm training on specific missions and train to decentralize swarm execution.  
Although centralizing the control of swarms works well in certain circumstances, 
it may not necessarily work in all operating environments. Decentralized swarms are 
more resilient, given that centralized execution presents a single point of vulnerability 
that could be problematic in the contested environments of near-peer adversaries. In 
addition, decentralized swarms provide versatility by enabling faster responses to a 
variety of dynamic circumstance, thereby minimizing the span-of-control challenges. 
Developers of naval doctrine have highlighted the value of being able to operate along 
this spectrum of command and control to full autonomy, or a spectrum between network-
centric warfare and network-optional warfare.139 Decentralization of swarms presents a 
difficult challenge, but one that the American Way of War must endogenize to enhance 
mission performance in dynamic environments and to overcome adversary actions that 
seek to disrupt, deny, and degrade America’s current advantages.  
To operationalize the framework presented in this thesis, the DoD must undertake 
an effort to create a variety of different wargames that machine learning techniques can 
self-play and master. To obtain the benefits of resiliency and versatility of a decentralized 
swarm, trust must exist within the human-autonomy team. Ultimately, building trust in 
the tactical environment comes down to higher-quality training. Therefore, establishing 
enough trust to decentralize decision making from the human to the individual drones 
within a swarm requires a novel approach to training. There are numerous different 
mission sets across all domains that could benefit significantly from this thesis initiative. 
The following section explores two relevant vignettes that highlight this potential. 
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conversation-with-authors-wayne-hughes-and-bob-girrier/37040. 
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1. Vignette 1: Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Patrols  
The Navy is seeking to leverage emerging undersea systems, like Hydroid’s 
Remus M3V and Teledyne Energy’s subsea drone refueling stations, for search, survey, 
and reconnaissance operations.140 In one scenario, the Navy envisions deploying swarms 
of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) ahead of a fleet operating in contested waters to 
survey the area for threats. Research sponsored by the Navy that examines how to 
employ UUVs for these missions claim that assured communications is critical to control 
their systems.141 This is because unmanned systems still need human operators and will 
thus “exacerbate manpower and manning challenges... [and] in many instances, the 
number of personnel required to operate and support a single unmanned system exceeds 
that for a manned platform with a similar concept of employment.”142 This approach, 
which relies heavily on the communications network, would centralize the operation 
of these drones under the Navy’s existing command and control architecture. In a world 
of perfect communication, a network-centric strategy like this may produce a high 
probability of mission success.  
However, the enemy gets a vote, and in contested environments, like the South 
China Sea, the Navy cannot assume a threshold level of communication within its entire 
network. To improve the ability to operate UUVs in challenging environments, the Navy 
needs to embrace a network-optional approach and decentralize its underwater swarms to 
increase both resiliency and versatility.143 To meet this need, the Navy should invest in 
the development of a mission-specific wargame that a narrow AI could self-play to train 
the local decision-making parameters of the individual UUVs and refueling stations. 
Much like the model presented in this thesis, the result of this effort would be a highly 
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specific (but adaptable) algorithm that the Navy could use to decentralize its swarms of 
UUVs to accomplish the search, survey, and reconnaissance mission. Importantly, this 
does not imply that there should not be an option to centralize or override the operation of 
their UUVs. Yet, if the Navy cannot transmit commands due to a need to limit electronic 
emissions, if the swarm cannot receive commands due to adversarial jamming, or if the 
scale of the swarm outpaces available manpower, then decentralization provides a way to 
overcome these obstacles and ensure freedom of action. 
2. Vignette 2: Collateral Scans for Kinetic Strikes 
Air strikes against terrorist leaders and other high profile figures within violent 
extremist organizations have become a mainstay of the American strategy to defeat their 
spread.144 Oftentimes, the DoD uses the term kinetic strike to describe these operations, 
which refers to “lethal air action controlled by dislocated strike cells against enemy time-
sensitive targets, and/or high-value individuals (HVI).”145 Although military analysts 
argue that kinetic diplomacy is never sufficient, they concede that an effective strategy 
still requires some level of violence, albeit discriminate violence.146 Therefore, increasing 
the performance of kinetic strikes is beneficial to the National Defense Strategy. 
However, executing these tactics is resource intensive. Often the demand for 
assets with the requisite combination of training, sensors, endurance, and munitions, 
outpaces the available supply. One particular resource-intensive task within the kinetic 
strike mission is conducting real-time collateral scans, or scanning the area to reduce the 
risk to non-combatants. Typically, multiple assets with visual sensors perform this task 
by scanning the target area of interest for any collateral concerns (e.g., vehicle traffic, 
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pedestrians, etc.). Determining the locations in which the aircraft should focus its scans 
and how to timely and accurately communicate potential collateral concerns in a rapidly-
changing environment are difficult tasks that are predominantly centralized.  
To increase the performance of kinetic strike missions, the DoD should develop 
an on-demand swarm of decentralized drones to perform the collateral scan mission. For 
example, using the Perdix micro-drone test147 as a baseline, existing aircraft would 
deploy a swarm of small, cheap, and lightweight drones to conduct collateral scans when 
conditions were met for a kinetic strike. This would decrease the number of traditional 
assets needed to mitigate the risk of collateral damage, and replace them with a resilient 
and versatile swarm of drones. Operating in this manner would require trust within the 
human-autonomy team. To achieve this, the DoD needs to develop a collateral scan 
wargame that a machine learning algorithm could self-play to train the local decision-
making parameters of the individual drones. In operation, the appropriate authority would 
first identify and pass the intended target to the trained swarm before deployment. Once 
deployed, the swarm would interact with the local environment, based on its AI assisted 
and validated training, to determine the best locations to position themselves, identify 
collateral concerns, and communicate concerns in a timely manner.  
Decentralizing the operation of drones performing collateral scans during a 
kinetic strike does not imply that the human is removed from decisions to employ lethal 
force. Rather, the aim is to speed the decision-making process of the human-autonomy 
team by allowing the swarm to self-organize and position itself at the best locations to 
conduct collateral scans and streamline real-time adjustments in a dynamic environment. 
Trying to centralizing the operation of a swarm in this type of scenario would at best be 
inefficient, and, at worst, be counterproductive and could result in missed opportunities to 
conduct a successful kinetic strike. Ultimately, applying the proposed framework of this 
thesis to the kinetic strike mission has the potential to produce swarm strategic utility. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are multiple approaches to advance the research and experimentation of the 
proposed Way of Swarm framework. This section highlights several areas of suggested 
future research, including improvements to the model, applications of sensitivity tests for 
risk mitigation and hardware investment priorities, opportunities for field-testing trained 
algorithms, innovations for building user interfaces, and experiments to test the spectrum 
of control for autonomy based on mission sets and performance (i.e., what conditions are 
best to centralize as opposed to decentralize the control of a swarm). 
1. Improve the Model 
Future researchers can improve upon the proof-of-concept model in this thesis by 
addressing both the wargame design and the machine learning techniques selected. For 
instance, researchers could enhance the wargame to simulate the specific capabilities of a 
known drone type, model a specific environment with greater accuracy, or reduce the 
level of abstraction in the wargame. For instance, adding more fidelity to the wargame, 
such as three-dimensional flight characteristics, adverse weather effects, and line-of-sight 
communications, will allow the machine learning technique to solve for a greater variety 
of unknown key decision-making parameters (e.g., optimal altitudes for flying drones). 
However, the more robust the simulation, the more time it will take to execute millions of 
simulations to generate datasets. Researchers will need to determine the right balance 
between the fidelity of the wargame, the desired key decision-making parameters, and the 
amount of resources available to iterate through millions of simulations.  
Additionally, researchers can incorporate more sophisticated machine learning 
techniques, such as artificial neural networks or Q-learning, to solve for decision-making 
parameters at a broader range. The underlying decision-making algorithm for the drone 
agents in this thesis was based on a set of linear equations containing a series of rates 
used for heating and cooling gameboard tiles along a critical decision-tree path. The 
genetic algorithm systematically adjusted the rates and proportions to determine optimal 
global behaviors. Alternatively, neural networks offer a design structure for discovering 
this decision-making algorithm by reducing the human template (i.e., the OODA loop) 
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down to a more primitive set of raw inputs and outputs. This approach could potentially 
reduce the amount of human investment when scaling this model across multiple military 
mission sets (e.g., UUV patrols, collateral scan for kinetic strikes, etc.), but it requires 
more research to optimize neural network designs for use in decentralized applications.  
Moreover, Q-learning is another powerful version of reinforcement learning that 
could be used to enhance the framework design. Q-learning uses a values function within 
the algorithm to choose an action based on a given state to earn an immediate and future 
reward. When the possible combinations of actions and rewards is large, a Q-learning can 
be used to output and update value functions as opposed to individual agent actions.148 
Therefore, as the complexity of the wargame increases, Q-learning provides a method to 
"determine the best weightings for optimal control and design problems."149 Overall, 
employing additional machine learning techniques could make the final swarm training 
framework more efficient and represents a valid area for further research. 
2. Conduct a Robust Sensitivity Test 
Creating both trust and confidence within the human-autonomy team is a critical 
objective to bring more autonomy to the battlefield. Chapter IV, Section B, discussed one 
method for using the framework to highlight residual risk via statistical analysis of the 
final trained algorithms. However, in addition to these tests, the framework needs a more 
robust series of tests to further understand the sensitivity of the wargame model and 
initial assumptions. Once the training framework generates a solution for a given mission 
and scenario, additional iterations should examine the implications of any errors in the 
assumptions used to develop the wargame. For instance, if the designers of the wargame 
underestimated the adversary’s capability (e.g., speed, weapons range, etc.) then the 
trained decision-making parameters of the swarm would not perform as advertised. 
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Hence, additional sensitivity tests provide a way to better understand the risks inherent in 
the solution, which increases both trust and confidence for the operator.  
Running a robust sensitivity test would consist of three distinct steps. First, 
designers of the wargame would modify key simulation assumptions. For example, if the 
original training iteration assumed an enemy attack range of one kilometer, designers 
would modify this value (e.g., increase to two kilometers). Second, developers would re-
run the training framework with the adjusted assumption to observe the differences in 
swarm algorithms produced. By changing the enemy’s characteristics, the drone swarm 
will respond by adapting its algorithm over the course of the training evolution, resulting 
in a different solution. Third, to understand the sensitivity of the model to each particular 
assumption, the test would need to culminate with a series of wargames between the new 
optimized adversary produced with the adjusted assumptions and the original drone 
swarm algorithm. This final step provides insight into the changes in the results that 
would highlight the risk inherent in each assumption used to build the model.  
Model sensitivity tests provide an analysis tool for commanders to further identify 
residual risk and to gain trust and confidence in the framework. Commanders deploying 
swarms that trained through a narrow AI can use this tool to determine ways to improve 
the assumptions within their control (e.g., shape their critical information requirements). 
This can improve the training model, and thereby improve outcomes on the battlefield. 
Not only can this tool identify which characteristics of the adversary present the greatest 
risk, but the tool can also indicate which characteristics of the drone swarm are the most 
critical for additional resource investment (e.g., sensor upgrades, battery life, speed, etc.). 
Furthermore, commanders could use this tool to determine how many drones it would 
take to achieve a desired mission effectiveness percentage or an acceptable level of risk.  
3. Field-Test the Trained Algorithms 
Although the experimental results support that the proposed training framework 
produces effective drone swarm algorithms, without any real-world flight validation, the 
operators responsible for mission accomplishment would likely be averse to trusting the 
swarm and employing them in combat. Field tests of the machine learning recommended 
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algorithms are the final step to build trust in the decision-making process of the swarms 
and serve as a location to build partnerships in the resulting human-autonomy teams. 
Installations, such as Camp Roberts in California, currently exist to field-test aerial drone 
swarm tactics, and organizations like the Naval Postgraduate School, Georgia Tech, and 
DARPA have used the installation extensively for the purpose of live flight validation.150  
Field tests can generate data to reduce the gap between the theoretical simulation 
and reality. Comparing real-world results to the wargame simulation provides the human 
and narrow AI with feedback to update the assumptions in the model. The model relies 
on updated assumptions to generate refined behaviors for the swarms in both subsequent 
training and operations. Therefore, combining additional sensitivity tests in simulation, 
along with real-world operational testing is critical for culminating a viable framework 
that remains rapid, agile, and flexible. 
4. Design a User Interface  
One of the critical areas of further research is determining the best practices for 
constructing a set of user interfaces for human operators to monitor and override drone 
swarms (a front-end interface) as well to change assumptions and mission-types for the 
algorithm model and to retrain key decision-making parameters (a back-end interface). 
For the front-end interface, the software package must be intuitive to deploy and operate. 
If the swarm has real-time communication links available during operations, the interface 
should also include options to monitor active swarm operations and to update information 
to the swarms with critical changes (e.g., updated intelligence priorities). Additionally, 
the front-end interface should have the option to manually override specific drone agents 
when deemed necessary by a human operator. Although the intent of the framework is to 
train the swarm to effectively operate without the need for constant human control, due to 
unforeseen circumstances, the consideration must be assessed to keep an override option 
available for the operators to switch to manual control mode as desired. 
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Beyond just being able to launch, monitor, and override drone swarms in the field, 
one goal of the swarm training framework is that the tools for modifying the wargames, 
updating mission assumptions, and retraining the swarms should also be accessible at 
forward locations. Being able to rapidly adjust the training of drone swarms to current 
scenarios and assumptions that are known by the operators of the swarms in the field will 
give those swarms a higher effectiveness than those swarms trained for more generalized 
missions and environments. However, this goal requires that researchers build and test a 
back-end user interface that allows users who are not computer programmers or machine 
learning experts to apply the framework to their unique drone swarm and mission set. 
The back-end interface should allow users to easily change the type of drone agents, the 
environmental parameters, intelligence assumptions, and the mission-specific objective of 
their assigned swarm, and then click “train” to output an updated and optimized set of 
decision-making parameters that the framework generates to fit a specific situation. 
5. Wargame the Spectrum of Control 
One critical claim made in this thesis research is about the importance of training 
decentralized (as opposed to centralized) swarms of autonomous systems. Future research 
could further explore which control modes are more effective for military drone swarms 
in unique mission sets and environmental conditions. In addition to testing whether one 
mode of control is better in certain situations, experimentation could also help determine 
best practices for building a hybrid framework of control. Is it always best to employ 
swarms under centralized control as long as the swarm can maintain communication with 
a powerful data center? Or, perhaps, is it best for swarms to execute as much as possible 
in a decentralized pre-trained algorithm mode, even if they have good communications, 
so that military personnel will have more opportunities to build trust on how the swarm 
responds in a variety of situations? In either case, as military forces train to fight in 
contested and degraded environments, the ability to survive without communication, 
whether intentional (i.e., network-optional) or unintentional (i.e., the enemy gets a vote) 
demands having the best-trained decentralized swarming techniques ready for forces to 
execute when necessary. 
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To emphasize the importance between decentralized and centralized control for 
drone swarms, future wargame designers should add the ability for narrow AI to assume 
different modes of control over individual drones or entire forces in their wargames. 
There is a lack of wargames that focus on how to better improve the decentralized control 
of agents, as opposed to focusing on improving the single human (or computer) player 
who usually directly controls all agents in the game. Instead of insisting on centralizing 
the game information to a single controller, more wargames should focus on how the 
agents could improve their decision-making ability given the agent’s constrained 
observations and understanding of the state of the game. A wargame can simulate the 
demand for decentralization by limiting agents’ “knowledge” of the state of the game so 
that not all agents always share perfect information. Essentially, each agent in a wargame 
gets its own observations and decision-making algorithm (i.e., its own OODA loop) and 
cannot always reliably receive new commands. With more focus on the agents, operators 
will concentrate less on maximizing their own decision-making processes, and instead, 
become more cognizant of the benefits of optimizing the agents’ algorithms. 
D. SUMMARY 
Ultimately, as the ability to employ small, inexpensive, and capable autonomous 
systems is increasing across all domains, the American military needs to adapt its way of 
fighting to ensure it maintains a competitive advantage. The current frameworks that 
intend to train swarm tactics to drones limit the potential for the human-autonomy team 
to succeed in complex, contested, or denied environments, by relying on communication 
to a centralized controller that will begin to over-task the human decision maker. To 
overcome this span-of-control barrier, the proposed Way of Swarm is a successfully 
demonstrated method to develop decentralized swarming algorithms based on training the 
decision-making parameters of individual drone agents. The synergy of mission-specific 
wargames, machine learning, and cloud-computing services provided a rapid, agile, and 
flexible framework to train swarming agents and generate effective training datasets in an 
otherwise data sparse area of research. When combined with future research that includes 
better models, a robust sensitivity analysis, field tests, and accessible user interfaces, the 
proposed framework will serve as a force multiplier to enhance human-autonomy teams.  
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The proposed Way of Swarm aims to enhance the human-autonomy team, but not 
completely remove the human from the decision-making process. Although this research 
trained a decentralized swarm to better accomplish a mission with minimal human input, 
this does not mean that human input and oversight is not a requirement. Rather, the goal 
of a decentralized drone swarm is to enable individual agents to make their own decisions 
given the operator’s intent, as part of a collective team, thereby rebalancing the workload 
of the human. This enables the operator to focus on tasks that are not suitable for AI-
trained systems, while maximizing the unique capabilities of the human in the team. This 
falls in line with the DoD’s vision for unmanned systems, contending that “the expansion 
of capabilities in unmanned systems over the coming decades will largely be dependent 
on the ability to effectively team humans and autonomous systems in the force.”151 This 
thesis has argued that effective teaming between human operators and swarms of 
autonomous systems requires trust in decentralized execution; building this trust is 
achieved by adapting new technologies into the strategic framework for training effective 
algorithms. 
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